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Market Access and National Treatment in
China-ElectronicPayment Serce. An Illustration of the
Structural and Interpretive Problems in GATS
Rachel Block*
Abstract
The Genera/Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) has proved to be a less effective
and more problematic instrument than hopedfor at its enactment nearly twenty years ago. A
recent case brought by the United States, China-ElectronicPayment Services, illustrates a
number of the problems, such as the uncertain definition and scope of sectors listed in Members'
schedules of liberalizationcommitments. The PanelReport also shows the unique challenges of
crafting a test and seling an evideniay burdenfor establishing a state-driven monopoy when
the industry has natural-monopoly characteristics-whichare typical of many tradable services
like telecommunications andpaymentprocessing networks. Further,this Panelwas the first to
deal with the complication of overlappingyet seemingly contradictorymarket access and national
treatment commitments in a particularsubsector. In this case, for electronicpayment services,
China appeared to commit to provide treatment no less favorable than that extended to
domestic suppliers,yet at the same time reserved the right to deny foreign suppliers access to the
Chinese market. Which inscriptiongoverns, given that GATS itselffprovides no clear rule for
interpretingsuch a schedule? The Panelconcluded that the denial of market access trumped the
granting of national treatment, an outcome that may be reasonable in this particularcontext
but which lacks afirm basis in the GATS text.
This Comment argues that the confusion about scheduling of market access and national
treatment commitments is symptomatic of deeper ambiguity about the scope of the disciplines
themselves. This Comment explores of the implications of four different interpretive rules in
eight different scheduling scenarios, extending the existing literature by more ful&y defining and
evaluatingthe rules and applying them to a broaderrange of situations. Ultimatey, no one rule
B.A. Economics 2004, Swarthmore College; M.Sc. Economics 2007, Universitat Pompeu Fabra;
J.D. Candidate 2015, The University of Chicago Law School. The author would like to thank
Professors Daniel Abebe, Anu Bradford, Saul Levmore, Eric Posner, and Randal C. Picker, as
well as practitioners Daniel J. Calhoun and Ellen G. Block, for their input. All opinions and
remaining errors are the author's own.
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can be consistent with the text of GATS and with the expectations of both the scheduling
Member and its trading partners. To resolve this problem, this Comment advocates a
pragmatic, empirical, harm- or surise-miniming approach aimed at approximating the
common intention of Members. Finally, this Comment considers the lessons of ChinaElectronic Payment Servicesfor the nascent negotiations on a new internationaltrade in services
agreement (TISA).
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I. INTRODUCTION

It is a precarious but possibly hopeful moment for multilateralism and
global trade in services. In September 2013, a new Director-General, Roberto
Azev~do, took the helm of the World Trade Organization (WTO). 1 Azev~do has
2
been candid about the stalled state of the Doha Round of trade negotiations
and is committed to breathe new life into them:
[l]t is clear that the system is in trouble.... I]he perception in the world is
that we have forgotten how to negotiate. The perception is ineffectiveness.
The perception is paralysis .... We must send a clear and unequivocal

message to the world that the WTO can deliver multilateral trade deals. 3
One symptom-and, to some extent, cause-of the stalemate in multilateral
WTO negotiations is the proliferation of alternative preferential trade
agreements (PTAs)-regional PTAs, such as the United States-driven TransPacific Partnership (WPP)4 and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP), and bilateral PTAs, such as the U.S.-Colombia trade agreement.6
Frustration with the limited extent of trade liberalization under the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)7 has also channeled the negotiating
energy of a number of countries toward an alternative international Trade in
Services Agreement (TISA).8
I
2

4

5

6

7

8

World Trade Organization, Roberto A.Zev6do Takes Over, \VTO N.Ws (Sept. 1, 2013),
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/news 13_e/dgra. 3aug13_e.htm.
On the state of the current round of negotiations, the Doha Development Round, see, for
example, UNFINISHED BUSINEss? THE WTO's DOHA AGENDA (Will Martin & Aaditya Mattoo
eds., CEPR & World Bank 2011); David Jolly, Next W. O. Head Wants a New Look at Body's Role,
N.Y. TIMiEs (May 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/09/business/global/next-wtohead-wants-a-new-look-at-the-bodys-role.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (noting that according to
some, it's too late to rescue the Doha Round).
World Trade Organization, AZevido Launches "Rolling Set of Meetings" Aimed at Delivering Success in
Bali, WTO NEws (Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/news13e/gcO9sep13
_e.htm.
United States Trade Representative, The United States in the Trans-Paific Partnership (Fact Sheet,
Nov. 2011), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact- sheets/201I/november/uniredstates-trans-pacific- partnership (last visited Sept. 26, 2013).
United States Trade Representative, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (F- IP) (Fact
Sheet, June 2013), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2013/june/wh-ttip
(last visited Sept. 26, 2013).
United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, Nov. 22, 2006 (entered into force May 15,
2012), available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/colombia-fta/
final-text.
General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 [hereinafter GATS].
See Pierre Sauv6, A PlurilateralAgenda for Services? Assessing the Casefor a Trade in Services Agreement
(17SA) 6 (NCCR Trade Regulation Working Paper No. 2013/29, May 2013), available at
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But the TISA is still in early-stage negotiations. GATS is not yet in the rear
view mirror, and perhaps it should not be. Is GATS-or the WTO's Dispute
Settlement Mechanism-broken? Is GATS too internally inconsistent to ensure
that Members' expectations and intentions are honored? Too limited in its
commitments to satisfy the United States and certain other countries? What
lessons for a new TISA can be drawn from GATS's strengths and weakness?
A recent WTO dispute, China-ElectronicPayment Services, can help answer
some of these questions.9 In this dispute, the United States challenged China's
restrictions on foreign provision of payment processing services in the credit
and debit card industry. The Panel agreed with the United States that China
violated its commitments under GATS when it failed to extend
nondiscriminatory treatment to non-Chinese suppliers such as MasterCard and
Visa.'" However, the Panel rejected the United States' claim that China had
effectively granted a monopoly to a domestic company, China UnionPay."
The Panel Report-one of very few reports to interpret GATS-highlights
the importance of clarity about the classification of services. By holding that the
United States' proffered evidence of a state-sponsored monopoly was
insufficient,12 the Panel Report also illustrates the challenge of assessing such
claims in a network industry with a two-sided market-a so-called platform.
Finally, and most significantly for this Comment, the Panel Report also shows
the crucial connection between the substance of obligations and the way in
http://www.nccr-trade.org/fileadmin/userupload/nccr-trade.ch/wp2/pubicatidons/TISA P
Sauve.pdf; Pasquale De Micco, The PlurilateralAgreement on Services: At the Starting Gate, Policy
Parliament,
DG
Policies,
European
for
External
Directorate-General
Briefing,
EXPO/B/PolDep/Note/2013_57 (Feb. 2013); Gary Clyde Hufbauer, J. Bradford Jensen &
Sherry Stephenson, Framework for the International Senrices Agreement (Peterson Institute for
International Economics, Policy Brief PB12-10, Apr. 2012). As of mid-September 2013, the
participating countries are Chile, Paraguay, Peru, Colombia, Panama, Costa Rica, Mexico, the
United States, Canada, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, the European Union, Turkey,
Israel, Pakistan, Korea, Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Australia, and New Zealand-but not any of
the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Request for Comments on
Additional Participants in Trade in Services Agreement, 78 Fed. Reg. 55135, 55135 (Sept. 9,
2013). China has apparently expressed interest in joining the TISA negotiations, though some
"[clynics think that China's interest in the TISA ... is that of a spoiler." One Model, Two
Inteopretations, ECONOMIST (Sept. 28, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/china/21586849relabelfing-relations-between-china-and-america-has-not-resolved-underlying-tensions-one-model.
9

Panel Report, China-CertainMeasures Affecting Electronic Payment Services, WT/DS413/R (July 16,
2012) [hereinafter China--ElectronicPayment Sendces Panel Report].

1

See infra Section II.A for a summary of the dispute. See also Panagiotis Deimatsis, The WI'DO
Outlaws the Privileges of the Chinese Payment Services Giant, 16 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. INSIGHTS, no. 31,
Sept. 28, 2012, available at http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/16/issue/31/wto-outlawsprivileges-chinese-payment-services-giant.

11

China--ElectronicPayment Services Panel Report, supra note 9,
Id. T 8.1 (e).

12

8.1 (d)(v)-(vi).
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which they are inscribed by Members in their schedules. In particular, this Panel
was the first to deal with the complication of overlapping yet seemingly
contradictory commitments in a particular subsector.
This Comment proceeds as follows. Section II.A gives an overview of the
China Electronic Payment Services dispute. Section II.B provides background on
the motivation, substance, and structure of GATS, introducing the market
access and national treatment obligations and the form and function of
Members' schedules of commitments. Section II.C introduces some of the
challenges of applying GATS in practice and of the WTO's approach to dispute
resolution in the multilateral trading system more generally. Section III follows
these threads while taking a closer look at the Panel Report and the Panel's
reasoning on a number of issues before it. In Section III.A, this Comment
argues that the current approach to defining the scope of scheduled subsectors
leaves too much room for confusion. Further, the novel method of defining a
service applied by the China-ElectronicPayment Services Panel-including within a
subsector all component services essential to delivery of the explicitly named
service-introduces its own problems, such as overlapping subsectors. Any new
agreement could avoid these problems by employing a so-called negative list
approach, whereby all services are presumed covered by a country's
commitments except for those expressly carved out. Section III.B considers the
hazily outlined evidentiary burden that the Panel required (and found wanting)
to substantiate the United States' claim that China had implemented a statesponsored monopoly. This Section argues that the particular nature of many
services-namely, two-sided networks or platforms-will require more direct
engagement by the parties and the WTO with the rapidly advancing economic
modeling of platform competition. Section III.C introduces the Panel's
interpretation of possibly inconsistent market access and national treatment
commitments, inscribed by China in its schedule, for the subsector that contains
electronic payment services.
Section IV expands on this issue, introducing and evaluating solutions to
the problem of ambiguously scheduled commitments within the GATS
framework. Section IV.A explains the overlapping relationship between the
market access and national treatment disciplines and the inextricable link
between the substance of these disciplines and Members' scheduling of specific
commitments in the disciplines. Section IV.B describes four potential rules for
interpreting conflicting commitments within a schedule, demonstrates the
outcomes of applying these rules to various scheduling scenarios, and evaluates
how well each rule follows the text of GATS while preserving the expectations
of the scheduling Member and its trading partners. Sections IV.A and IVB
emphasize that the China-Electronic Payment Services Panel Report does not
provide sufficient guidance about how to resolve inconsistencies that take forms
other than that in China's schedule, and may not even properly apply to a
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different case with the same Unbound/None 3 scheduling conundrum. Further,
Section IV.C concludes that no one rule can satisfy all goals, and proposes two
approaches for how the WTO could arrive at a satisfactory rule going forward.
One route would be to openly identify the internal inconsistencies and take a
pragmatic, empirical approach to approximating the common intention of
Members, based on ferreting out and resolving existing problems in Members'
schedules. A somewhat less satisfying but still reasonable approach would be to
limit the precedential impact of the interpretation of one ambiguous schedule
entry on other disputes. Panels could base their case-by-case rulings on the
plausible prior expectations of the parties to the particular dispute, with the goal
of minimizing surprises and approximating the common intention of the parties
to the dispute. Section V.A summarizes the preceding analysis of the ChinaElectronic Payment Services Panel Report, and Section VB closes with a discussion
of the recently announced negotiations on a new services agreement.
II. BACKGROUND: CHINA-ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SERVICES
IN CONTEXT
A. The Dispute
The United States initiated the case in September 2010, alleging that China
had violated its market access and national treatment commitments, 14 under
GATS Articles XVI and XVII respectively, to liberalize trade in electronic
payment services (EPS). According to the United States, China had instituted a6
number of measures that effectively established state-owned China UnionPay
as the sole supplier of EPS for (i) inter-bank and cross-region payment card
transactions, (ii) all payment card transactions paid in renminbi (RMB) in China
13
14

15

16

See infra Table 1 and text accompanying notes 63-65.
As discussed in the text accompanying infra notes 56-61, a market access commitment is basically
an agreement to open the door to services supplied by other Members, while a national treatment
commitment is an agreement to treat those foreign suppliers no less favorably than domestic
suppliers.
Request for Consultations by the United States, China-CertainMeasuresAffecting Electronic Payment
Services 1-2, WT/DS413/1 (Sept. 20, 2010). EPS are basically the services performed by the likes
of Visa, MasterCard, and their competitors. A fuller definition is provided in infra Section lII.A.
UnionPay (which the Panel calls China UnionPay or CUP) was originally a department within the
People's Bank of China (PBOC), China's central bank. It is majority-owned by the four largest
Chinese banks (which are state-owned). See Vincent Wang, Visa and China Union Pay:An Update on
Their Struggle, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE PAYMENT LAW ADVISOR (Dec. 1, 2011),
http://www.paymentlawadvisor.com/2011/12/01/visa-and-china-union-pay-an-update-on-theirstruggle/; Mr. Dai Xianglong, Governor of the PBOC, Remarks at the Opening Ceremony of
China UnionPay (Mar. 26, 2002), available at http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/english/
955/1965/19653/19653 .html.
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using cards issued in Hong Kong or Macao, (iii) all RMB transactions in Hong
Kong or Macao using cards issued in China, and (iv) perhaps even all RMB
transactions in China, regardless of where the card was issued-thereby
excluding foreign competitors. 7 The United States also alleged that China had
required that all payment card processing devices be compatible with
UnionPay's network; that all payment cards bear the UnionPay logo, regardless
of who issued the card; and that all card-accepting merchants in China display
the UnionPay logo and accept UnionPay cards. 8
The United States claimed that the overall effect of these requirements was
to grant UnionPay a regulation-based competitive advantage in the market for
EPS within China, in some instances rising to the level of an outright
monopoly. 9 The United States then argued that China had undertaken Article
XVI market access and Article XVII national treatment commitments for these
electronic payment services, described in subsector 7.B(d) of its GATS schedule,
and that the challenged measures were inconsistent with those commitments.20
After initial consultations failed, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)
established a Panel in mid-2011 to hear the case. 2' A year later, the Panel Report
was circulated to Members, who adopted the Report at the August 2012 meeting
of the DSB.22 Both parties have declined to appeal the case.23
The result was only a partial win for the United States. 24 The Panel found
that China had in fact implemented a number of the challenged measures. The

17

Request for Consultations by the United States, China--ElectronicPayment Serices, supra note 15, at

18

2; China-ElectronicPayment Services Panel Report, supra note 9, 7.209. See also Request for the
Establishment of a Panel by the United States, China-CertainMeasuresAffecting Electronic Payment
Services 1, \WT/DS413/2 (Feb. 14, 2011) (providing additional detail about the restrictions
allegedly imposed and their relationship to China's commitments under GATS).
China-ElectronicPayment Services Panel Report, supra note 9, 7.209.

19

Id.

20

system in which CUP is the only entity that can supply EPS for RMB transactions', or that the
measures 'ensure and consolidate CUP's monopoly position.' ").
Id. 7.208; Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, China-Electronic

21

Payment Services, supra note 17, at 4-5.
Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of the United States, Note hy the Secretariat.

22

China--CertainMeasures Affecting ElectronicPayment Services 4, WT/DS413/3 (uly 5, 2011).
China--CertainMeasures Affecting Electronic Payment Services: Summary of the Dispute to Date, WTO

23

24

7.482 ("The United States considers that the net effect of these measures is to 'create a

(Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu_e/casese/ds413 e.htm (last
visited Nov. 11, 2013).
The period for appeal has now ended. Thus, the Panel Report is the final word on the dispute. See
W]O Adopts Electronic Payments Ruling as China, U.S. Decline Appeals, 29 INSIDE U.S.-CHINA TRADE,
no. 18, Sept. 5, 2012, available at Westlaw, 2012 WLNR 18881280.
See id. (quoting U.S. and Chinese representatives and officials statements, with both sides claiming
a win).
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Panel also found that, in subsector 7.B(d), China had undertaken both national
treatment and partial market access commitments for trade via commercial
presence of foreign suppliers in China, and national treatment commitments for
cross-border supply.25 The Panel agreed that some of the measures were
inconsistent with China's obligations and recommended that China bring these
measures into conformity. 26 However, the Panel also read China's somewhat
ambiguous schedule to create no market access obligations for cross-border
supply.27 Further, the Panel rejected the United States' claims that certain
measures created an across-the-board monopoly for the processing of all
domestic RMB payment card transactions, explaining that the United States had
provided insufficient evidence.2 i
B. The Basics of GATS
1. The drive for liberalization of trade in services.
The General Agreement on Trade in Services, which came into force in
1995 as part of the Uruguay Round of negotiations that also established the
WTO, is a multilateral agreement aimed at eliminating barriers to international
trade in services. 29 After the successes of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT 3 in reducing barriers to trade in goods, policymakers turned their
attention to liberalizing trade in services as technological change, particularly in
telecommunications, made trading services more feasible. 3 Policymakers also
recognized that affordable, reliable services are essential inputs for tradable
goods-consider transportation of manufactures and agricultural products to

25

China--Electronic Payment Services Panel Report, supra note 9,

26

Id.

27

Id.

28

Id.

8.1 (summarizing the Panel's

findings).

29

GATS preamble, supra note 7. Participants concluded negotiations in 1994 as part of the Uruguay

30

Round and the resulting agreement came into force in 1995.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194

31

[hereinafter GAIT].
See, for example, Bernard Hoekman & Carlos A. Primo Braga, Protection and Trade in Services 3-4
(World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 1747, Apr. 1997), available at http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/lB/2000/02/24/000009265-39711101
41258/Rendered/PDF/multi page.pdf ("lInformation technology advances] tend to increase the
tradability of services to the extent that they make [it] easier to unbundle the production and
consumption of information-intensive service activities-e.g., research and development,
software development, data entry, inventory management, quality control, accounting, personnel,
secretarial, marketing, advertising, distribution and legal services.").
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domestic and foreign markets, for example. 2 At the same time, services were
becoming a bigger share of the global economy and of trade.33 Liberalizing trade
in services promised the static gains from trade familiar from goods market
liberalization--efficiency gains from cross-border specialization according to
comparative advantage-and dynamic spillover gains, as cheaper and better
services can lubricate production in other parts of the economy. 4
In addition to technological feasibility and economic desirability, favorable
domestic politics were a necessary ingredient in making GATS a reality because
the modes of trade, and thus forms of barriers to trade, are more complicated
for services. Services are intangible and, unlike goods, are delivered through
more varied modes of supply. Consider the four modes of international supply
of services covered by GATS, introduced as part of the definition of trade in
services in GATS Article I:'
* Mode 1 Cross-bordersuppy. A consumer receives services from
abroad through telecommunications or postal infrastructure.
Examples include market research reports, telemedicine, distance
training, or architectural drawings.
" Mode 2 Consumption abroad. A person travels and consumes services
abroad, for example, as a tourist, student at a foreign university, or
patient at a foreign hospital.
* Mode 3 Commercialpresence. A service is provided by the local
affiliate, subsidiary, or representative office of a foreign firm, such
as a bank, hotel chain, or law firm. Commercial presence thus
includes the important category of foreign direct investment.
" Mode 4 Presenceofnaturalpersons. This includes services provided by
employees who migrate to work in the local affiliates or offices of
foreign firms, such as an American who transfers to the London
office of an American accounting firm, as well as the services of a
person who goes abroad to work independently, say, as an
engineering consultant.36

32

See id. at 17.

33

See id. at 1.

34

See id. at 4.

35

GATS art. I:2, supra note 7.
See Trade in Services Division, 7be GeneralAgreement on Trade in Services: An Introduction (World
Trade Organization, Jan. 31, 2013), available at http://www.wto.org/English/tratopE/serv e/
gsintr e.pdf (providing examples). See also Diana Zacharias, Article I GATS: Scope and Definition, in
\ TO TRADE IN SERVici.s 31, 48-53 (Ridiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll & Clemens
Fein~iugle eds., Max Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law No. 6, 2008) (pointing out
potential areas of overlap and confusion among the modes).

36
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Barriers to these types of trade can, unsurprisingly, take many forms-explicitly
discriminatory quotas, like limits on foreign capital, local sourcing requirements,
or tariffs on goods like motion pictures that primarily embody services;
standards, like banking prudential requirements, which might be stricter for
foreign firms; licensing requirements for professional services and restrictive visa
or work permit policies; local-supplier government procurement policies;
discriminatory access to distribution networks;" or even more subtly, failure to
enforce domestic antitrust laws against national champions.3 8 Liberalization thus
required that domestic regulations enter into the picture, in addition to barriers
to cross-border trade flows and movement of foreign service providers or
consumers.3 9 During the heyday of the Washington Consensus, 40 many emerging
markets were deregulating domestic services markets in order to attract foreign
direct investment, which brought financing plus managerial and technological
expertise.4" This reduction in domestic regulations was a necessary complement
to opening international trade because seemingly source-neutral domestic

37

38

39

See, for example, Geza Feketekuty, Assessing and Improving the Architecture of GATS, in GATS 2000:
NEW DIRECTIONS IN SERVICES TRADE LIBERALIZATION 85 (Pierre Sauv6 & Robert M. Stern eds.,
Brookings Institution, 2000); Hoekman & Braga, supra note 31, at 5-12; Bernard Hoekman,
Assessing the Genera/Agreementon Trade in Services, in THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 88,90 (Will Martin & L. Alan Winters eds., 1996).
See Anu Bradford, Antitrust Law in GlobalMarkets, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS
OF ANTITRUST LAW 283,301-08 (Einer Elhauge ed., 2012) (discussing two forms of protectionism
through domestic antitrust laws: laws that discriminate as written-for example, a country may
enact very strict antitrust laws for an industry in which it is a net importer-and biased
enforcement of an otherwise neutral antitrust law).
See Hoekman & Braga, supra note 31, at 21-22; Nancy J. King & Kishani Kalupahan, Choosing
Between Liberalization and Regulatog Autonomy under GATS. Implications of U.S.-Gamblingfor Trade
in Cross Border E-Services, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1189, 1201-02 (2007). See generally
PANAGIOTIS DELIMATSIS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES AND DOMESTIC REGULATIONS:
NECESSITY, TRANSPARENCY, AND REGULATORY DIVERSITY (2007).

40

41

The term Washington Consensus, originally coined by economist John Williamson in 1989, refers
to the set of policy reforms broadly advocated for developing countries in the 1990s by the
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the U.S. government, and the leading Washington
think tanks, with the goals of growth, low inflation, a sustainable balance of payments, and
equitable income distribution. Washington Consensus, in THE PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
WORLD ECONOMY 1169, 1169 (Kenneth A. Reinert& Ramkishen S. Rajan eds., 2009) (identifying
the core defining policies as "(1) fiscal discipline, (2) increased public expenditure on social
services and infrastructure, (3) tax reform to broaden tax bases and reduce marginal tax rates, (4)
market-determined interest rates, (5) unified and competitive exchange rates, (6) import
liberalization, (7) openness to foreign direct investment, (8) privatization, (9) deregulation, and
(10) secure property rights"). See also John Williamson, A Short History of the Washington Consensus
(Sept. 2004) (unpublished conference paper), available at http://www.iie.com/publications/
papers/williamson0904-2.pdf.
See, for example, ECONOMIC GROwrH IN THE 1990s: LEARNING FROM A DECADE OF REFORM ch. 3
(Roberto Zagha & Gobind T. Nankani eds., World Bank, 2005).
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regulations (not just clearly discriminatory measures like tariffs) can be indirect
barriers to trade.42
2. The substance and structure of GATS commitments: disciplines
and schedules.
The agreement creates three types of obligations or disciplines 43unconditional, conditional, and specific:
Unconditional. Found in Part II of GATS, these are mandatory
obligations, also called top-down, because they apply automatically
to all services.' This category includes a commitment to
transparency4" and a "Most-Favoured-Nation" (MFN) provision
that prohibits a Member from discriminating among its trading
partners; it must treat each Member just as well as any other.46
Speific. These disciplines, found in Part 1II of GATS, are opt-in.
They are often called bottom-up obligations because they apply
only to the extent that a Member chooses to include various
subsectors in its schedule of specific commitments; the default is
no commitment.47 These obligations are purely optional for each
sector and arise out of negotiations among Members, applying to
only those sectors that each Member includes in its schedule-and
only to the extent stated in the schedule. The disciplines of "Market
Access" (Article XVI) and "National Treatment" (Article XVI1) are
in this category." Thus, neither access to another Member's
domestic market nor treatment equivalent to that enjoyed by
domestic suppliers is guaranteed. Instead, they are negotiable for
49
each sector and mode of supply.

42

See id.

43

The text and associated literature generally use "obligations" or "disciplines" to refer to the major
principles of GATS and "commitments" to refer to the extent to which a country has agreed to
abide by these disciplines. See GATS preamble, supra note 7. Confusingly, the obligations in Part
Ill of GATS are called "Specific Commitments" but they are, in fact, "disciplines."

44

See, for exampk, GATS arts. I1-II1, supra note 7. See also NELLiIm

45

22-25 (2010).
GATS art. Il1, supra note 7.
GATS art. 11:1, supra note 7.

46
47
48

49

MUNIN, LEGAL GUIDE- TO

GATS

GATS arts. XVI-XVII, supra note 7. See also MUNIN, supra note 44, at 27.
See also GATS art. XVIII, supra note 7 (leaving room for the negotiation of additional specific
commitments not otherwise captured by Articles XVI and XVII).
MUNIN, supra note 44, at 27. For an explanation of modes of supply, see supra text accompanying
notes 35-36.
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Conditional. These disciplines, found in Part 11,50 apply only to
subsectors in which a Member has made specific commitments.
They are meant to balance Members' domestic regulatory
autonomy with trade liberalization."1 Domestic regulation may
inevitably have collateral protectionist effects. GATS requires
reasonable, impartial administration of domestic regulations in the
subsectors where a Member has undertaken specific
commitments.5 2 A related provision permits Members to take
measures that enable domestic monopolies, but such measures
must still be consistent with the universal MFN obligation and with
Members' specific commitments.5 3
This Comment focuses on the scheduling, interpretation, and enforcement
of specific commitments. Table 1, a simplified excerpt from the United States'
schedule for a particular subsector, provides a sample of how a schedule looks in
practice, while Appendix A provides a more complete example from China's
schedule.
*

50

See, for example, GATS arts. VI & VilI, supra note 7.See also MUNIN, subra note 44, at 24-25.

51

See generally DEJIMATSIS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES AND DoMESTIc REGULATIONS,

52

53

supra note 39.
GATS art. VI, supra note 7. Article VI does not, however, require a Member to prove that a
challenged domestic regulation is the least trade-impairing means available to achieve its domestic
policy goals.
GATS art. VIII, supra note 7.
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TABLE 1. Simplified Sample Schedule Based on an Excerpt of the United
54
States' Schedule
Sector or subsector

Limitations on market access

Limitations on national
treatment

7. FINANCIAL
SERVICES
A. INSURANCE

Mode I Cross-border supply:
None (full commitment to grant
foreign suppliers access to the
U.S. market
Mode 2 Consumption abroad:
None (full commitmen)
Mode 3 Commercial
presence:
Generally, brokerage firms
can offer services in most
states by obtaining licenses
as "brokers" and in other
states by obtaining licenses
to operate as "agents."
Brokerage licenses are not
issued in FL, IA, KY, MI,
MN, MS, OR, TN, TX, VA,
\WV, WI. (commitment only in
some states, and subject to local
licensing laws)
Mode 4 Presence of natural
persons:
Unbound, except as
indicated in the horizontal
section.55 (no commitment

Mode 1 Cross-border supply:
None (fudl commitment to treat
foreign and U.S. suppliers equally
favoraby)
Mode 2 Consumption abroad:
Unbound (no commitmen)
Mode 3 Commercial presence:
None (full commitmen)
Mode 4 Presence of natural
persons:
Brokerage licenses are not
issued to non-residents in
SD, WY.
Brokerage licenses are issued
to non-residents for only
certain lines of insurance in
AL, AR, LA, NM.
Higher license fees for nonresidents may be charged in
AK, AZ, AR, CA, GA, HI,
IN, KS, LA, ME, MD, MA,
MT, NE, NV, NH, NJ, NM,
NC, ND, OH, OK, PA, RI,
SC, UT, VT. (commitment in
most states, and subject to local
licensinglaws-which may be
discriminatoyin many states)

d) Services
Auxiliary to
Insurance:
i) Brokerage
Services

54

Adapted from The United States of America - Schedule of Specific Commitments 60, GATS/SC/90 (Apr.
15, 1994). The content of the commitments has been slightly simplified and explanatory textidentifying each mode of supply by both name and number, and indicating the meaning of
"None" and "Unbound"-has been added.

55

The "horizontal section" is the portion of a Member's schedule where the Member lays out any
commitments or restrictions on commitments that will apply to all subsectors that appear in the
schedule.
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Article XVI:1, part of the market access discipline, establishes that a
Member's schedule sets a ceiling on the barriers to market access that the
Member will impose on foreign services and suppliers.56 Article XVI:2
enumerates six prohibited measures-four quantitative limits on the number of
suppliers and amount of services" and two inherently discriminatory restrictions
on the form and extent of foreign participation. 8 Article XVI:2(a), for example,
binds committing Members not to limit the number of service suppliers through
"numerical quotas, monopolies, exclusive service suppliers or the requirements
of an economic needs test."5 9
Under Article XVII, on national treatment, a Member commits to treat
foreign suppliers no less favorably than domestic suppliers, "in respect of all
measures affecting the supply of services," for the sectors and modes of supply
indicated in its schedule.60 A measure constitutes less favorable treatment if "it
modifies the conditions of competition in favour of [domestic] services or
service suppliers ...
Recall that the market access and national treatment disciplines do not
apply to all subsectors automatically-which is why scheduling is so important.
In fact, under GATS Article XX ("Scheduling Specific Commitments"),
schedules are "an integral part" of the GATS text itself.62 Article XX:1 requires
56

GATS art. XVI:1, supra note 7 ("[Ejach Member shall accord services and service suppliers of any
other Member treatment no less favourable than that provided for ... in its Schedule."). Note,
the GATS text frequently refers to "services and service suppliers." For the sake of brevity, this
Comment sometimes refers to only one or the other.

57

These are limitations on (a) the number of suppliers; (b) the value of traded services; (c) the
number of units of the service traded or the number of operations; and (d) the number of people
working in the sector. GATS art. XVI:2(a)-(d), supra note 7.

58

These are (e) measures which require some specific type of legal entity or joint venture; and (f)
caps on the amount or share of foreign capital. GATS art. XVI:2(e)-(), supra note 7. One could
argue that in subparagraph (e), joint-venture requirements are inherently discriminatory but legalentity requirements (such as a rule against limited partnerships) are not. For simplicity's sake, this
Comment treats all subparagraph (e) requirements as inherently discriminatory.

59
60

GATS art. XVI:2.
GATS art. XVII:1, supra note 7.

61

GATS art. XVII:3, supra note 7.

62

GATS art. XX:3, supra note 7. In addition to the scheduling information in GATS Article XX,
there are three sets of scheduling guidelines, issued between 1993 and 2001, but they do not
necessarily resolve all schedule interpretation questions. See Scheduling of Initial Commitments in Trade
in Services: Expl4anatogy Note, MTN.GNS/W/164 (Sept. 3, 1993) and Add.1 (Nov. 30, 1993);
Committee on Specific Commitments (CSC), Schedulng Guidelines: Background - Note lj the
Secretariat,S/CSC/W/12 (Oct. 10, 1997); Council for Trade in Services, Guidelinesfor the Scheduling
of Specific Commitments Under the GeneralAgreement on Trade in Serices (GATS), S/L/92 (Mar. 28,
2001). As these guidelines are not part of the treaty itself, they are not a primary means of
interpretation. See China-Electronic Payment Services Panel Report, supra note 9, 7.650 n.849;
Petros C. Mavroidis, Highway XT/I Re-Visited The Roadfiom Non-Discriminationto MarketAccess in
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each Member to list all subsectors in which it is undertaking market access
and/or national treatment commitments.6 3 If a subsector is not listed in a
Member's schedule, that country has made no specific commitments in that
subsector. But inscribing a subsector in one's schedule is not all or nothing. The
Member can reduce the extent of its commitment in a scheduled subsector by
adding "limitations" and "qualifications. ' At the extremes, writing "None"
next to a subsector indicates no barriersto trade in that subsector, for a particular
mode of supply, while "Unbound" indicates that the Member makes no
commitment to liberalize. Members may also specify anything that falls in between
"None" and "Unbound." The schedules thus reflect both a "positive list
approach"-whereby a Member chooses the sectors in which it will provide
foreign competitors with market access and/or nondiscriminatory national
treatment-and a "negative list approach"-whereby the Member may restrict
and condition its scheduled commitments.6 5
Crucially important for China-Electronic Payment Services, Article XX:2
instructs that "[m]easures inconsistent with both Articles XVI [market access]
and XVII [national treatment] shall be inscribed in the column relating to Article
XVI [market access]. In this case the inscription will be considered to provide a
' Thus,
condition or qualification to Article XVII [national treatment] as well." 66
the market access and national treatment columns cannot be read in isolation.
This language suggests that an inscribed national treatment commitment is
conditioned on, or limited by, the extent of the corresponding market access
commitment for the same sector and mode of supply.

63

GATI, 6 WORLD TRADE Riv. 1, 7 (2007) (explaining that while early GATS panels had given
greater weight to the scheduling guidelines, the Appellate Body in U.S.-Gambling (see infra note
76) ruled that the guidelines were merely supplementary means of interpretation). (For an
explanation of primary and supplementary means of interpretation, see infra text accompanying
notes 76-78.) Also, when interpreting a particular Member's schedule, guidelines promulgated
after negotiation of that schedule might be of little import. In this dispute, China, the United
States, and commenting third-party Members disagreed about whether the 2001 guidelines should
inform the Panel's interpretation of China's schedule, which was negotiated before those
guidelines were adopted. The Panel did not resolve the issue. China-ElectronicPayment Services
Panel Report, supra note 9, 7.187.
For an example, see infra Appendix A (providing an excerpt from China's schedule).

64

GATS art. XX:1, supra note 7. For a given subsector, limitations are entered separately for market
access and for national treatment, and individually for each mode of supply. Members may also
introduce limitations applicable to all sectors by inscribing them in the "horizontal section" of the
schedule. Scheduling ofInitialCommitments in Trade in Services: Explanatory Note, supranote 62, at 9-10.

65

See DEI.IMATSIS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES AND DOMESTIC REGULATIONS, supra note

39, at 30-31; Martin Molinuevo, Arlicle XX GATS: Schedules of Spedfic Commitments, in WTOTRADE IN SERVICES, supra note 36, at 451, 455.
66

GATS art. XX:2, supra note 7. See discussion infra Section III.C.
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C. Principles and Problems of Treaty Interpretation and
WTO Jurisprudence
According to Article 3.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU),67
the WTO's Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) is meant to lend "security
and predictability to the multilateral trading system."68 The ruling of a Panel or
of the Appellate Body should "preserve the rights and obligations of
[m]embers... and [] clarify the [] provisions of [] agreements in accordance
with customary rules of interpretation of public international law."69 Under DSU
Article 19.2, such rulings "cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations"
of Members under GATS. v° But as an increasing number of commentators have
noted, the Appellate Body has violated this stricture in practice.7 '
Instead of focusing "narrowly on the specific facts under review,"72
Appellate Body reports have made "broad pronouncements on the meaning of
the governing agreement."73 In discerning that meaning, the Appellate Body has
displayed "a belief rooted in civil law tradition that law must be unambiguous
and, therefore, there is, in each case, a single correct interpretation of it."74 The
Appellate Body has treated its chosen interpretation "as the only permissible
one, even if this interpretation may add to or diminish the rights and obligations
under the relevant provisions"--contrary to the mandate of Article 19.2 and
contrary to what Members understood they had bargained for.7"
The Appellate Body has also limited the acceptable means of reaching that
single legitimate interpretation, by equating "customary rules" in DSU Article 3.2
with the rules of interpretation provided for in the Vienna Convention on the

67

Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 3.2, Apr. 15,

68

1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S.
401,407 [hereinafter DSU].
Id.

69
70

71

72

Id.
Id.arts. 3.2 & 19.2.
See, for example, Michel Cartland, Gerard Depayre & Jan Woznoski, Is Something Going Wrong in the
IFI0 Dispute Settlement? 46 J. WORLD TRADE 979 (2012); John D. Greenwald, A Comparison of
WIO and CIT/ CAFCJuisprudence in Review of U.S. Commerce Department Decisions in Anlidumping and
Countervaiing Duy Proceedings,21 TuL.J. INT'L & COMp. L. 261 (2013).
Greenwald, supra note 71, at 263.

74

Id.See also Cartland, Depayre & Woznoski, supra note 71, at 987 (noting that the Appellate Body
seems to prefer the broader work of clarifying the meaning of multilateral agreements).
Greenwald, supra note 71, at 263. See also Cartland, Depayre & Woznoski, supranote 71, at 987.

75

Cartland, Depayre & Woznoski, supra note 71, at 987.

73
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Law of Treaties (VCLT).76 Article 31 of the VCLT provides a "[g]eneral rule of
interpretation" of treaties, calling for "good faith [interpretation] in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in the light of its object and purpose." 7 The goal is to discern the one
correct meaning by analyzing a limited set of sources. "Supplementary means of
interpretation," described in VCLT Article 32, are available only as a last resort,
if interpretation pursuant to Article 31 "(a) [l]eaves the meaning ambiguous or
obscure" or "(b) [l]eads to a ... manifestly absurd or unreasonable" result."
Even so, the rules are generic enough to cover the gamut of reasonable
tools for interpreting treaties-but therein lies the problem:
The VCLT [] is far from being exact science; it reflects various elements of
interpretation, but falls short of establishing with precision the weight to be
given to each one of them. Hence, it is not unheard of that, in the name of
courts have reached divergent decisions on more or less identical
the VCLT,
79
issues.
Assurance that one's own schedule, or the schedule of a trading partner, will be
interpreted using the VCLT does not actually provide much of a clue about what
factors will be decisive in determining the scope of a commitment in the event
of a dispute. The point is not that some better rule of interpretation would
always create predictable outcomes; the point is that Members could lose
patience with and confidence in a system that denies the ambiguities and
slippages that inhere in it, thereby potentially masking the actual reasons for any
particular outcome.
Members may also be concerned that their intentions, expressed in their
own schedules, will be frustrated by "an excessively broad interpretation of
[their] specific commitments... [which] would constitute an unacceptable
impairment of WTO Members' rights to define the scope and content of such

76

Id.; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter
VCLTI. See also China-ElectronicPaymentServices Panel Report, supra note 9, 7.9 ("lhe meaning
of the [Member's] GATS Schedule must be determined according to the rules codified in Article
31 and, to the extent appropriate, Article 32 of the Vienna Convention.") (quoting Appellate
Body Report, United States-MeasuresAffecting the Cross-BorderSuppy of Gambling and Betting Services

77

78

VCLT art. 31(1), snpra note 76. The VCLT also makes reasonable allowances for consideration of
the parties' subsequent agreements or practices, and for any "special meaning" of a term if it is
clear that's what the parties intended. VCLT art. 31(3)-(4).
VCLT art. 32, supra note 76.

79

Petros C. Mavroidis,

160, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) [hereinafter U.S.-Gambling Appellate Body Report]).

Crisis? What Crisis? Is the WTO Appellate Body coming of Age?, in

OPPORTUNITIEs AND OBLIGATIONS: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAl. AND

173,176 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 2009).
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commitments."8 Any individual Member challenged in a dispute likely reads its
own commitments more narrowly than the challenging party. But a Member's
intentions will also be frustrated if the commitments of its trading partners are
read more narrowly than the Member expected or hoped. Presumably, each
Member has conceded somewhat more than it wishes to be held accountable
for, while at the same time aiming to hold all other Members accountable for
conceding somewhat more than those other Members ultimately wish to give. In
other words, the legal meaning of a Member's schedule is a compromise. The
Appellate Body, and the China-ElectronicPayment Services Panel, have expressed
it somewhat differently, explaining that the "task of identifying the meaning of a
concession in a GATS Schedule, like the task of interpreting any other treaty
text, involves identifying the common intention of Members." 81 It may not seem
that reading a Member's schedule as a compromise is any different from reading
it as the expression of the Members' common intention, but the latter framing
can make it difficult for a panel to be transparent about the sources of
disagreement, the motivations for the parties' arguments, and its own rationale
for settling on one meaning over others.
It is worth noting that the weaknesses in the China-Electronic Payment
Services Panel Report detailed in Section III below reflect larger institutional
problems, not any failings by this particular panel. Given the structure and
content of the instruments to be interpreted and, in light of existing Appellate
Body jurisprudence, the tools available to do so, this Panel-faced with a multibillion dollar dispute between two interdependent, often battling, sometimes
irascible trading giants-worked their way to a moderate, sensible result. But
that does not mean that those instruments, those interpretative tools, and that
jurisprudential model are without problems.
III. THE CHINA-ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SERVICES
PANEL REPORT
The Panel Report addresses three major questions: (A) Which services are
the subject of the U.S. complaint, and do those services appear anywhere in
China's schedule? (3) Did China impose the alleged requirements on the supply
of electronic payment services, and did the imposed requirements effectively
grant UnionPay a monopoly? (C) Finally, what is the legal effect of the seemingly
contradictory market access and national treatment commitments that China
inscribed in its schedule? The difficulties the Panel faced in answering these

s0 China--ElectronicPayment Servces Panel Report, supranote 9,
81

7.65 (describing the concerns voiced

by Ecuador, which exercised the right of third-party Members to weigh in on the dispute).
Id. 7.9 (quoting U.S.-Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 76, 160).
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questions, and the limited suitability of the tools it employed, illustrate how
challenging it is in the current GATS framework to ensure the predictability of
the legal and economic effect of a Member's schedule of specific commitments.
A. A Service Subsector Includes "All Services Essential," "All
Means," and "All Business Models"
82
The parties disagreed about how to define electronic payment services
and whether and where China had inscribed any liberalization commitments for
such services in its GATS schedule of commitments. China argued that the
services provided by a firm could be EPS only if (i) the firm was a primary
payment card company (PCC), with its own network, like Visa or UnionPay (and
not a third-party intermediary);84 and (ii) the firm did not also perform other,
non-EPS payment services such as issuing cards directly to consumers-a
service typically performed by banks such as Citibank or HSBC. s But the Panel
(and the United States) disagreed with the idea that the classification of a service
largely depends on the identity or ownership structure of the suppliers.86 Instead,
the Panel concluded that regardless of who the supplier is, EPS constitute a
cluster of services that typically includes the following elements: 7

(i) the processing

infrastructure,

network,

and ...

procedures

that

facilitate ... information and payment flows and [ ]provide system integrity;
(ii) the process ... of approving or declining a transaction... ; (iii) the
delivery of transaction information among participating entities; (iv) the
calculation [I and reporting of the net financial position of relevant
institutions for all transactions ... ; and (v) the facilitation [of] ...the
transfer of net payments owed among participating institutions.

Although its discussion was couched in terms of precise "textual analysis,"88 the
Panel got to the right place-its conclusion that what matters is the service, not

83

China--ElectronicPayment Services Panel Report, supra note 9, 7.37. The Panel had to define the
term electronic payment services-the term used by the United States in its complaint-in order
to determine the scope of the dispute before it. The Panel could not rule on China's
commitments in and regulation of services beyond the scope of the initial pleadings. Id.T 7.34.
Id. 7.63-64. The Panel had to determine if EPS appeared in China's schedule of commitments

84

because otherwise China would have been under no legal obligation to open its market to foreign
supply of EPS.
Id.TT 7.34, 7.47.

85

Id.

86

China-ElectronicPayment Services Panel Report, supra note 9,

87

Id.

88

complaint).
Id. 7.53.

82

7.34, 7.38.
7.130.

7.41 (drawing heavily from the definition proffered by the United States in its original
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realities of the
the identity of the supplie?3 9 -by considering the economic
90
industry and what industry players actually think and do.
In addition to defining EPS, the Panel also had to locate EPS in China's
GATS schedule to determine whether China had made any specific
commitments to liberalize trade in EPS. Again, common sense-and not the
Panel's extensive and unnecessarily formalist textual analysis-was enough to
resolve the question, indicating that EPS are in subsector 7.B(d) of China's
schedule. The conclusion is unsurprising: it's hard to imagine that China did not
mean to include EPS in the subsector it defined as "all payment and money
transmission services."9 1 But the Panel went even further: 9 2
[I]he use of the term "all" manifests an intention to cover comprehensively
the entire spectrum of "payment and money transmission services"...
[and] an intention to include all services essential to payment and money
transmission, all means of payment and money transmission... , and all /]
business models ....
This would be a bold claim to make even if China's negotiators had originally
drafted these words themselves. And in fact, China merely copied the phrase from
a list of definitions in the GATS Annex on Financial Services.93 An intention to
89

As the European Union put it, Members schedule their commitments by "referring] to the
services, not to the participants in the transaction." Australia, Guatemala, and South Korea-the
other third parties that weighed in-agreed. Id. 1 7.40.

90

91

For example, in deciding that services are the same whether provided by third-party processors
(intermediaries between PCCs and other players such as banks that issue cards or work with
merchants that accept cards) or by PCCs themselves, the Panel noted that major PCCsincluding MasterCard and Visa-see third-party processors as direct competitors. Id. 7.53.
Though not mentioned by the Panel, UnionPay also sees third-party processors as a competitive
threat for certain services. See Ke Wang, Research on the Cooperation between Commercial Banks and
Third Pary Payment, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 4TH (2012) INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
FINANCIAl. RISK AND CORPORATE FINANCE MANAGEMENT, no. 2,421 (Yangru Wu & Yanxi Li
eds., 2012) (analyzing the regulatory and market drivers of third-party processors' ascent in China,
and the cooperative and competitive aspects of their relationships with banks and other
established market participants).
China-ElectronicPayment Senrices Panel Report, supra note 9, 11 7.78-79.

92

Id. 7.99 (emphasis added).

93

There are a few instruments that deal specifically with financial services. The scheduled
commitments ultimately agreed upon in 1997, three years after the core GATS negotiations had
concluded, are usually characterized as the Financial Services Agreement (FSA) or the Fifth
Protocol. The FSA is not a separate instrument laying out disciplines other than those already in
GATS. Rather, many countries scheduled deeper commitments than they had originally in 1994,
and these changes were formally recognized as the Fifth Protocol, which subsequently became
known as the Financial Services Agreement of 1997. The other relevant instruments are the
Annex on Financial Services and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services. The
Annex, an early stop-gap measure, provided some general definitions of financial services but
didn't actually introduce any commitments. Nor did the Understanding, which was created as an
alternative to the GATS Part 111 framework. The result of an initiative by high-income countries, it
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use the boilerplate terminology hardly manifests an intention to take the
expansive view characterized by the Panel.
It is troubling that the Panel attributed such a strong intention in this
instance, in which China reproduced the text from the Annex on Financial
Services-without considering whose intention it was-and yet elsewhere treated
China's alterations of the boilerplate Annex language as having no effect.9 4 For
example, China added the phrase "(including import and export settlement)" to "
the version of the language found in the Annex on Financial Services.9" The
Panel concluded that "the parenthetical phrase merely seeks to make explicit...
something that the broad phrase '[a]ll payment and money transmission
services...' already contains implicitly."96 The awkward grammatical
construction-it is a negotiator, not a "parenthetical phrase," that "seeks" and
has intentions-signals how abstract schedule interpretation under the VCLT
97
has become, in the name of seeking out the "common intention" of Members.
The Panel did not treat the all services essential / all means / all business
models concept as worthy of much explanation or defense.98 The approach
achieved what the Panel needed it to do-rescue the discourse out of the weeds

effectively provides a harmonized "model schedule" of sizeable commitments. It is not a part of
GATS; rather, some countries (not including China) agreed to follow the Understanding's
guidelines in scheduling their GATS commitments in financial services subsectors. See Fifth
Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services, Dec. 3, 1997, 2065 U.N.T.S. 160
[hereinafter FSA]; GATS, Annex on Financial Services, supra note 7; Understanding on Commitments
in FinancialServices, LT/UR/U/1 (Apr. 15, 1994). See also Eric H. Leroux, Trade in FinancialServices
under the World Trade Organhzation, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 413, 426-32 (2002); MUNIN, supra note 44,
at 418-19; MICHAEI.J. TREBII.COCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 379-81 (3d ed. 2005).
94

The doctrine of effet utile
is certainly within the Appellate Body's interpretive toolbox. See, for
example, Appellate Body Report, United States-Standardsfor Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline
23, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) ("IlInterpretation must give meaning and effect to all the
terms of a treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole
clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility."). See also Mark E. Villiger, The Rules on
Interpretation:Misgivings, Misunderstandings, Miscarage? The 'Crucble' Intended by the InternationalLany
Commission, in THE LAW OF TREATIES BEYOND THE VIENNA CONVENTION 105, 110 (Enzo
Cannizzaro ed., 2011) (explaining that the effet utile principle follows from VCLT Article 31's
concern for a treaty's object and purpose).

95

China--Electronic Payment Services Panel Report, supra note 9,
7.118. See infra Appendix A
(providing an excerpt of China's schedule).
China-ElectronicPayment Services Panel Report, supra note 9, 7.118. For another example, see the

96

Panel's treatment of the heading "Banking services as listed below," which appears only in
China's schedule. Id 7.134.
97

98

See stpra text accompanying note 81.
The Panel did pause to define (albeit in a footnote) how it was using the word "essential," namely,
to "refer to all component services which are needed to complete a payment transaction or
money transmission." China--ElectronicPaymentServices Panel Report, supra note 9, 7.99 n.142.
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of dictionaries and financial treatises.99 But unlike the principle that what matters
is the service and not the identity of the supplier, this all-in approach is not a
particularly workable tool. It comes dangerously close to contradicting the
uncontested principle that "the sectors and subsectors in a Member's Schedule
must be mutually exclusive."' 0 And it still requires looking somewhere else to
determine the actual limits of the subsector, because otherwise, it could go on
forever. It would be naive to argue that one subsector ends where the next
begins, both because it's tautological, and because it creates uncertainty about
what a Member must do in its schedule if it wishes to make specific
commitments in some but not all possible service subsectors.
B. The United States Did Not Meet the Evidentiary Burden to
Show an Across-the-Board Sole-Supplier Requirement
In the biggest win for China, the Panel rejected the United States' claim
that, for domestic RMB payment card transactions, China's regulations
effectively prohibited the use of non-UnionPay cards, creating a UnionPay solesupplier requirement.' The United States had not argued that one particular
measure mandated an economy-wide monopoly. 2 Instead, it argued that
instruments expressly requiring that some transactions be processed by
UnionPay and imposing business specifications and technical standards for all
transactions "work together.., to explicitly or implicitly restrict entry,...
impose technical barriers to entry ... [and] make[] it 'economically unviable' to
enter" into the Chinese market.0 3 The net effect was to "implititly recognize that
[UnionPay] is the sole supplier of EPS services for RMB denominated
transactions.' 0 4

99

See id. at nn.120-28 (filling two pages and citing a half-dozen sources in order to define
"payment," "money," and "transmission").

100

Id. 7.177 (quoting U.S.-Gambling Appellate Body Report, supranote 76,

101

Id.

102

The Panel distinguished between a monopoly (a de jure or de facto state-authorized sole supplier)

103

and an exclusive supplier (any one of a small number of suppliers, among whom competition is
substantially prevented by the state). The Panel noted that the United States' allegations were
more consistent with an exclusive-supplier model, but the United States' own claims, and thus
much of the Panel's discussion, referred to a monopoly or sole-supplier requirement. China7.587-88.
Electronic Payment Services Panel Report, supra note 9,
Id. 7.487.

104

Id.

180 n.219).

7.507.

7.483 (emphasis added). For example, the United States objected that even if a foreign
supplier convinced an issuer to issue a card, China's issuer requirements would effectively bar the
foreign supplier from compromising UnionPay's prominent logo or obtaining any market share
"to the certain exclusion" of UnionPay. Id. 7.298. See also id. 7.390 (summarizing the United
States' concerns about government-assisted "entrench[ment]").
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The Panel was not entirely unsympathetic. In some places, it seemed that
the panelists felt constrained by the highly legalistic framework in which they
operate, and wished that the United States had marshaled better evidence.' °5 The
Panel did make a nod to the importance of branding and the challenge of
breaking into the market because of UnionPay's legal advantages:
[T]he instruments in question place [UnionPay] in a unique position ....
Even though the relevant instruments would not prevent acquirers 0 6 or
merchants from accepting other cards, [UnionPay] has a significant foothold
in the market. The fact that [UnionPay] does not have to invest in
promoting its brand to issuing institutions 107 (because issuer requirements
are mandatory), and does not have to invest in persuading banks to acquire
transactions for the [UnionPay] brand (because acquirer requirements are
also mandatory) further solidifies [UnionPay's] privileged position 08
But these legal advantages were not enough to "sustain the assertion that the
instruments produce economic effects that are so significant that they preclude
other EPS suppliers from operating in the market."'0 9 As long as it was
technologically feasible for a foreign EPS provider, say, Visa, to run a parallel
network-with Visa-branded payment cards, business standards and technical
specifications matching Visa's practices in other countries, and Visa-compatible
terminal equipment-then, according to the Panel, China had not imposed a
sole-supplier requirement for domestic RMB transactions.' The Panel found
105

Seefor example, id. 7.463-64 (asking, in the exasperated tone of a parent, why the United States

did not timely submit evidence of a UnionPay operating rule prohibiting any UnionPaycompatible (and thus UnionPay-branded) cards from displaying the name or logo of any company
deemed to be a potential competitor of UnionPay: "We are unclear why the United States did not
identify these regulations earlier.").
106 Acquirers, which are often banks, work with merchants, signing them up to accept a particular
type of card (known as aggregating or acquiring transactions), connecting them to payment
networks, and maintaining merchant accounts. China-Electronic Payment Services Panel Report,
supra note 9, 7.15.
107 Issuers, such as Citibank or CapitalOne, interact directly with consumers (soliciting cardholders,
establishing terms such as credit limits and interest rates, collecting payment) and with payment
card networks (in order to authorize transactions and transmit funds). Id. 7.14.
108 Id. 7.503.
109 Id. 7.504.
110 China-ElectronicPayment Services Panel Report, supra note 9,

7.299 ("[W]e find no basis to
conclude that the issuer requirements that relate to interoperability would prevent the issuance of
single or dual currency cards that would be capable of being processed over more than one interbank network in China."); id.7.334 ("Mhe relevant provisions ... do not state that the terminal
equipment that must be capable of accepting bank cards bearing the Yin lian/UnionPay logo
must not be capable of accepting, at the same time, bank cards bearing the logo of different EPS
suppliers."); id. 7.360 ("MXJ~e have no basis ...to conclude that the acquirer requirement that
mandates the posting of the Yin 1jan/UnonPay logo prevents the posting of other EPS
suppliers' logo, much less the acceptance by acquirers of bank cards that are capable of being
processed over an inter-bank network in China other than that of [UnionPay].").
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that none of the instruments identified by the United States would, alone or in
combination, prevent Visa from running a parallel network-provided the cards
and terminal equipment bore the UnionPay logo and were interoperable with
UnionPay's terminals and cards."'
The Panel may have defined what constitutes a barrier to trade in this very
narrow fashion out of some hesitation to apply an effects test, despite precedent
that an effects test might be appropriate. In a previous GATS dispute, the
Appellate Body suggested that if a measure in effect limits the number of
suppliers, it is prohibited by Article XVI:2(a), regardless of the form of the
measure:
[T]he reference, in Article XVI:2(a), to limitations on the number of service
suppliers "in the form of monopolies and exclusive service suppliers"
should be read to include limitations that are in form or in effect, monopolies
or exclusive service suppliers.... []t is clear that the thrust of subparagraph (a) is not on the form of limitations, but on their numerical, or
12
quantitative, nature.'

Inexplicably, the lesson that the China-Electronic Payment Services Panel took
from this passage was that it "must focus, not on whether [the challenged
measures] formally or explicitly institute a monopoly or an exclusive service
supplier, but on whether they constitute a limitation that is numerical and
quantitative in nature."' 13 In other words, the Panel skipped over the first
italicized phrase, "or in effect," which was the Appellate Body's main point, and
instead emphasized the numerical nature of prohibited measures-as if there
were any substantive difference between a barrier to entry and a limitation on
the number of entrants. The Panel ideally wanted the United States to provide a
smoking gun-"specific legal provisions designating a company as the single
supplier in a market.""' 4 But the Panel also said that the United States might
have satisfied its burden by providing "economic analyses and econometric
studies [] alleging actual economic and trade effects of particular measures.""' At
the end of the day, the Panel could not clearly say whether it is appropriate to
use an effects test to determine if challenged measures violate Article XVI:2(a),
or precisely what evidence would be enough to satisfy such a test.
One reason for the Panel's puzzling reasoning may be its failure to address
head-on that an electronic payment system, like many services covered by

111

Id. 9 7.504 ("[G]iven the lack of concrete evidence, we are unable to conclude that [UnionPay] is

112

the sole supplier. Assertion without more is simply not enough.").
U.S.-Gambling Appellate Body Report, supranote 76, T9 230-32.

113 China--ElectronicPayment Senices Panel Report, supra note 9, T 7.593.
114 Id. 7.504.

115

Id. (emphasis added).
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GATS, creates a very specific type of market-namely, a two-sided market, or
platform, that exhibits network externalities."1 6 An EPS supplier, say, "CardPay,"
supplies a platform to two markets. CardPay must market its cards to
consumers, on one side, and also sign up merchants (the other side of the
17
market) to accept these cards, either by itself acting as an issuer and acquirer,
or by paying others to do so.118 Because the market is two-sided, there are, in a
sense, double the network externalities (and double the coordination problems).
One set of positive externalities, or complementarities, arises from increased
participation of parties on the other side of the network.119 The more merchants
there are who accept CardPay, the more demand there will be among consumers
for CardPay-branded payment cards, and thus willingness to sign up for a card
with a higher interest rate or fees than a less widely accepted card. Likewise, the
more consumers there are who have CardPay cards, the more worthwhile it will
be for a merchant to set up an account with CardPay, install the necessary
terminal equipment, and pay the fees charged for each transaction. 120 The other
set of positive externalities arises from the benefit to existing participants of new
participants joining the same side of the network. Additional CardPay cards in
the hands of consumers benefit existing CardPay card-holders because as the
market deepens, more merchants will accept the card; similarly, CardPay-

116 See generall Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Plaform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1 J. EUR.

117

118

ECON. ASS'N 990, 990 (2003) (developing a core economic model for the study of competition in
those "markets with network externalities [that] are [also] characterized by the presence of two
distinct sides"-in the case of EPS, cardholders and merchants-"whose ultimate benefit stems
from interacting through a common platform"); Geoffrey G. Parker & Marshall W. Van Alstyne,
Two-Sided Netvork Effects: A Theogy of Information Product Design, 51 MGMT. SCI. 1494, 1495 (2005)
(collecting examples of two-sided markets with "platform intermediaries").
See supra notes 107 and 106 for the definition of issuers and acquirers, respectively.
See Rochet & Tirole, Plaiform Competiion, supra note 116, at 990 ("To succeed, platforms in
industries such as software [ ] and [ ] payment systems ... must 'get both sides of the market on
board.' Accordingly, platforms devote much attention to... how they court each side while
making money overall."). The second definitive feature of two-sided markets, in addition to the
need to bring both sides of the market on board, is the absence of the conditions under which the
Coase theorem would predict the same outcome regardless of where the costs are initially
placed-in other words, how the platform operator distributes costs across the two sides of the
market affects the outcome. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress

Report, 37 RANDJ. ECON. 645, 645 (2006).
119 See Joseph Farrell & Paul Kiemperer, Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and
Network Effects, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1967, 1974 (Mark Armstrong &
Robert H. Porter eds., 2003) (defining "indirect network effects," which are those positive
externalities that "arise through improved opportunities to trade with the other side of a market").
120 See Rochet & Tirole, Platform Competition, supra note 116, at 990.
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accepting merchants benefit from broad acceptance because it tips more
consumers toward carrying CardPay cards. 2'
Because of the underlying economics of payment card networks, the
existence of a single provider (or one that dominates the field) does not necessariy
mean that the firm is benefitting from government measures intended to prevent
entry by new suppliers, including foreign ones. It is true that the phenomenon of
multihoming, in which more than one competing network exists, is common in
the payments industry: many consumers carry both MasterCard and Visa, for
example, and many merchants accept MasterCard, Visa, Discover, and other
cards.122 However, while it would be no surprise if the Chinese government were
favoring a national champion,'2 3 it is at least conceivable that the conditions
necessary for a multihoming equilibrium124 are not currently present in China,
independently of any government intervention to bolster UnionPay. Nor does
the dominance of one network necessarily mean the outcome is socially
suboptimal. 2 Platform competition unsurprisingly tends to lower the total fees
incurred by merchants and consumers,"' but for a given level of total fees, the
in a suboptimal distribution of costs
existence of multiple platforms may result
27
consumers.
versus
between merchants

122

See Farrell & Klemperer, supra note 119, at 1974 ("A good exhibits direct network effects if
adoption by different users is complementary, so that each user's adoption payoff, and his
incentive to adopt, increases as more others adopt."); Parker & Van Alstyne, supra note 116, at
1495 (explaining that "the externality benefit can run across markets and back again," with the
benefit of increased same-side participation coming through its effect on participation in the other
side of the market).
Rochet & Tirole, Plaiform Competition, supra note 116, at 992 (citing as an example of multihoming

123

that "merchants accept both American Express and Visa" and "consumers have both Amex and
Visa cards in their pockets").
See, for example, Multinationals in China: Guardian Warriors and Golden Eggs, ECONOMIST (Aug. 24,

124

2013), http://www.economist.com/news/business/21584045-states-crackdowns-big- firms-arenot-all-about-bashing-foreigners-guardian-warriors-and (describing the complaints and fears of
foreign businesses operating in China).
There is a large, highly technical literature on the mix of conditions that will result in multiple

125

competing platforms. See, for example, Robin S. Lee, Competing Pla'forms, J. ECON. MGMT. STRAT.
(forthcoming), available at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/-rslee/papers/CompetingPlatforms.pdf.
Sujit Chakravorti, Externalities in Payment Card Networks: Theoy and Evidence, 9 REV. NETWORK

121

126

127

ECON., no. 2, 8 (2010) (providing a useful review of the current state of the field, and nothing that
"[n]etwork competition may result in lower social welfare contrary to generally accepted
economic principles").
Id. (citing Sujit Chakravorti & Roberto Roson, Plaiform Competition in Two-Sided Markets: The Case of
Payment Networks, 5 R-v. NETWORK ECON., no. 1 (2006)).
Chakravorri, supra note 125, at 8 (citing Graeme Guthrie & Julian Wright, Competing Payment
Schemes, 55 J. INDUST. EcON. 37, 39 (2007)). Recall from supra note 118 that the distribution of
costs affects the outcome in a platform industry.
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The core lesson for future panels and disputants is that in the context of
platform-like services, the economic models and observations sufficient to
establish that an outcome is the result of "particular measures ' will need to be
different from those evaluated in disputes about trade in goods. If the
relationship between legal cause and economic effect is not what traditional
models predict it to be, then a poorly tailored effects test could erroneously
indicate legal wrongdoing. Yet Members must be held accountable for violating
Article XVI:2(a) commitments. It falls to the complaining Member to devote
some expert-witness money 129 to the economists building this rapidly evolving
field, to help develop reliable economic evidence of the effects of government
measures.
C. China Reserved the Right to Limit Market Access-Despite
Its National Treatment Commitments
1. The structural relationship between Articles XVI and XVII was
previously uncertain.
Though Articles XVI and XVII themselves are silent about their
interrelationship, Article XX:2 clearly contemplates overlap between measures
prohibited by both Articles XVI and XVII-namely, those quantitative
restrictions enumerated in XVI:2(a)-(d) that are also discriminatory against
foreign services or suppliers and any restrictions covered by XVI:2(e)-(f), which
are inherently discriminatory. 130 As mentioned above, Article XX:2 of GATS
instructs that "[mleasures inconsistent with both Articles XVI and XVII shall be
inscribed in the column relating to Article XVI. In this case the inscription will
be considered to provide a condition or qualification to Article XVII as well.''
While Article XX:2 was meant to eliminate duplication and confusion, 3 2 it
actually creates a difficult and pressing interpretive problem. It does protect a
128

See supratext accompanying note 115.

129

See

130

SIE7"rI.IMFNT 315 (2009) (describing the use of economic expert witnesses in WTO disputes).
Nondiscriminatory quantitative restrictions enumerated in Article XVI:2(a)-(d) violate Article XVI

131

but not Article XVII. For the purposes of this Comment, measures covered by Article
XVI:2(e)-measures requiring a specific type of legal entity or joint venture-and by Article
XVI:2(f)--caps on the value or share of foreign capital in a sector-are inherently discriminatory,
and thus violate Article XVII. See, for example, Panagiotis Deimatsis, Don't Gamble with GA SThe Interaction between Ariles KI, XT/I, X71 and XVIII GA7S! in the Light of the U.S.-Gambling
Case, 40 J. WORLD TRADE 1059, 1072 (2006). See also MUNIN, supra note 44, at 211. Note,
however, that the academic literature and even WTO documents have been somewhat muddled
on whether XVI:2(e) measures are inherently discriminatory. See supra note 58.
GATS art. XX:2, supra note 7.

132

Delimatsis, Don't Gamble with GATS, supra note 130, at 1072-73.
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Member from unintentional national treatment commitments in subsectors
where it intends to grant (somehow limited) market access and national
treatment commitments.'3 3 But significant uncertainty remains:
[Article XX:2] falls short of providing ready answers when a Member
undertakes a commitment under one of the columns but not the other....
[T]here is nothing in the GATS text that would [determine], in the case of
unbound [limits on] national treatment, whether.., measures...
inconsistent with both market access and national treatment obligations
should be governed by the existence of a full commitment under market
access, or rather by the absence of a commitment under national treatment.
And, conversely, no GATS provision gives an answer to the question of
whether, in the presence of [] unbound [limits on] market access,...
measures inconsistent with both Articles XVI and XVII should be ruled by
the existence of a national treatment commitment, or, rather, by the absence
134
of a market access commitment.
It is this latter situation-no limitations on the national treatment obligation, but
largely unbound limits on market access-that arises in China-ElectronicPayment
13
Services, based on China's scheduling of mode 1, sector 7.B(d) commitments.
2. China's withholding of market access means it need not extend
national treatment.
According to the Panel, China made the commitments in subsector 7.B(d)
illustrated in Table 2. The problem? How to interpret the entry for mode 1,
where China made an apparently unfettered national treatment commitment, yet
reserved the right to impose any of the Article XVI:2 barriers to market access,
each of which either can be or is always discriminatory in form. In other words,
if a measure limits market access (for example, by limiting the number of
suppliers that can process Hong Kong and Macao RMB transactions to just one)
and thereby modifies the conditions of competition in favor of that sole
(domestic) supplier by disallowing competition, which provision in the schedule
takes precedence-the stated commitments and limitations in the market access
column or in the national treatment column?

133 Id.
134

Id.at 1073.

135

See China-EletronicPayment Senices Panel Report, supra note 9,

7.644-70.
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TABLE 2. Summary of China's Commitments in Electronic Payment Services' 36

Mode 1.
Crossborder
supply
Mode 3.
Commercial
presence

Article XVI.

Article XVII.

]AT--

National Treatment

A -,

Complete liberalization
commitment. Limitations China
may impose on national treatment
are "None."

Qualified liberalization
commitment. Only limitations
China may impose on market
access are time-limited
geographic, client-type, and
licensing requirements and
minimum assets or years of
experience for certain foreign
financial institutions establishing
subsidiaries in China; otherwise,
39
"None."'1

138

Qualified liberalization
commitment. Only limitations
China may impose on national
treatment are geographic and
client-type restrictions that also
apply to market access; otherwise,
,,None.,,140l

After saying that Article XX:2 is just a "scheduling rule"' 1 (which is never
defined) and does not create a hierarchy between Articles XVI and XVII, the
Panel arrived at its solution-basically, a scheduling hierarchy.1 2 By inscribing
"Unbound" in the market access column, China reserved the right to impose
any of the measures enumerated in Article XVI:2. According to the Panel,
China's inscription of "None" in the national treatment column does not
actually mean that China committed not to impose discriminatory measures.
China reserved the right to impose any of the measures enumerated in Article

136

See id.

See infra Appendix A (providing an excerpt of China's schedule), at text accompanying note vii.
See infra Appendix A, at text accompanying note vii.
139 See infra Appendix A, at text accompanying note vi.
140 See infra Appendix A, at text accompanying note viii.
137
138

141
142

See, for example, China-ElectronicPayment Services Panel Report, supra note 9, 7.661.
In denying that there is any ambiguity about the scope of, and hierarchy between, Articles XVI
and XVII, and instead locating the source of ambiguity in the insciption of unbound limitations on
market access and no limitations on national treatment in China's schedule, the Panel appears to
be trying to limit the scope of its decision.
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XVI:2 even when they are discriminatory inform, in other words, even when they fail
to extend national treatment to like services and suppliers of other Members."
According to the Panel's rule, what China held onto with "Unbound" was
not taken away by "None." To put it another way, what China offered with
"None" it actually kept, in part, with "Unbound." The Panel did not address the
fact that a scheduling hierarchy necessarily dictates the underlying substantive
relationship between disciplines-that it is impossible to have just a scheduling
rule that does not also require a particular view of the scope of application of
Articles XVI and XVII.
3. The requirements actually imposed
commitments in China's schedule.

violated

the

(limited)

The United States argued that China violated its market access
commitments to "accord services and service suppliers of any other Member
treatment no less favorable than that provided for in China's schedule," under
Article XVI, and national treatment commitments to accord to foreign "services
and service suppliers ... treatment no less favorable than that it accords to its
own like services and service suppliers," under Article XVII." Coming to three
core conclusions, the Panel agreed with some of these claims-but not to the
extent hoped for by the United States:
• As noted above, the Panel had found that China made national
treatment commitments for both modes 1 and 3 (though for mode 1, the
national treatment commitment had no effect). The Panel then
concluded that the issuer, acquirer, and terminal equipment requirements
modified the conditions of competition in favor of UnionPay, violating
China's mode 3 national treatment commitment.'
" The Panel had found that China made no mode 1 market access
commitment, but did make a mode 3 market access commitment under
Article XVI:2(a)-thus committing not to limit the number of service
suppliers for supply via commercial presence in China. According to the
Panel, China maintained UnionPay as a monopoly supplier for certain
RMB transactions related to cards issued in or transactions occurring in
Hong Kong or Macao. Thus, the Panel concluded that China's Hong
Kong/Macao requirements gave UnionPay a monopoly for certain

144

7.660-63 (describing their conclusions and how they reached them).
Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, China-ElectronicPayment Services,

145

supra note 17, at 1.
China-ElectronicPaymentServices Panel Report, supra note 9,

143

Id.

8.1 (f(i)-(iii).
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transactions, violating China's mode 3 market access commitments
under Article XVI:2(a).146
However, because the Panel had rejected the United States' allegation,
on the basis of insufficient evidence, that China maintained UnionPay as
an across-the-board monopoly supplier for the processing of all
domestic RMB payment card transactions, the Panel then rejected the
United States' market access and national treatment claims arising from
the alleged sole-supplier requirement.'47
Both China and the United States claimed victory.'4 8
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO RECONCILING
INCONSISTENT MARKET ACCESS AND NATIONAL
TREATMENT INSCRIPTIONS

For at least a decade, the WTO has been aware of the problem created by
the combination of overlap between Articles XVI and XVII, the scheduling
convention of Article XX:2, and Members' inscribing different degrees of
commitment and limitations on commitment in the market access and national
treatment columns of their schedules.149 However, none of the various councils
and committees, nor the Members collectively, have reached an agreement about
how to address the problem in interpreting existing commitments. 50 In 2003,
the WTO Committee on Specific Commitments (CSC) proposed rules for
dealing with internally inconsistent scheduling, but they described the different
rules in very general terms, and explained how each would apply in only a few

Id. 8.1(e)(i), (e)(v).
Id. 8.1(e)(ii)-(iv), (e)(vi)-(vii), (O(vi).
148 See VfO Adopts Electronic Payments Ruling, supra note 23.
149 See Committee on Specific Commitments (CSC), Considerationof Issues Relating to Article XX:2 of the
GATS', JOB(03)/213 (Nov. 20, 2003), available as Annex I to Council for Trade in Services,
Consideration of Issues Relating to Article XX:2 of the GA 1.": Report b the Chairmanof the Committee on
.Spedfic Commitments, S/C/W/237 (Mar. 24, 2004). See also Aaditya Mattoo, NationalTreatment in the
GATS : Corner Stone or Pandora'sBox?, 31 J. WORLD TRADE 107, 107 (1997) (pointing out, six years
before the CSC report, that the relationship between Articles XVI and XVII had "not been clearly
delineated" and that "there is a difference between the text of Article XVII and the structure of
the Schedules of Commitments, which makes it difficult to interpret the scope of the national
treatment obligation").
IS0 Consider the absence of sources of authority used by the Panel to resolve the particular issue in
this case. See generally China--ElectronicPayment Services Panel Report, supra note 9, 7.645-70. See
also Mavroidis, Highway XVI re-visited, supra note 62, at 2 (emphasizing that "the negotiators were
not on the same page [about the relationship between Articles XVI and XVII] even after they had
agreed on the definitive legal texts").
,46

147
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scenarios.15 As a result, it's not possible, based on their contribution alone, to
discern any universal rules for all situations, or even a piece-wise rule (that is, a
rule that prescribes an outcome for every scheduling scenario, but not
necessarily by following a singlepinnplein all cases). There is also no consensus
in the academic literature on the subject.'52 Finally, no panel has had to directly
address the problem of inconsistent inscriptions.5 3
A primary reason for this lack of consensus is that it is impossible to talk
about scheduling rules without first agreeing on the substantive scope of Articles
XVI and XVII. Understanding the scope of the market access and national
treatment disciplines is not a mere academic exercise. Nor is it rendered moot by
the Panel's ruling in China-Electronic Payment Services and the progress of
negotiations on the TISA. It will be years before the TISA's terms are hashed
out and participating countries' commitments made, and even longer before
China and others become parties to that agreement. Regardless of the criticisms
of GATS, it will retain its vitality as long as no agreement has adequately
displaced it, and billions of dollars5 4 are at stake in the meaning of Members'
existing GATS commitments. So it's important to work with GATS on its own
terms and identify approaches for resolving existing ambiguities that are
consistent with Members' current schedules.
Section IV.A below addresses the relationship between a scheduling rule
and a substantive rule about the scope of the disciplines. Section IV.B then
evaluates the different possible rules of schedule interpretation.

152

See CSC, Consideration of Issues Relating to Article XX:2, supra note 149,
15-20 (providing a limited
treatment of scheduling rules). See also id. 21 ("The description of the issue, and the various
options outlined above are presented merely to provide a basis for discussion.").
See generaly Delimatsis, Don't Gamble with GATS, supra note 130, at 1072-75 (summarizing the

153

rules proffered by the CSC, without extending any of them to more complicated scheduling
scenarios); Joust Pauwelyn, Rien ne Va Plus? Distinguishing Domestic Regulation from Market Access in
GA7T and GATS, 4 WORLD TRADE REV. 131, 148-51, 161 (2005) (distinguishing between
overlap in the measures subject to scrutiny under Articles XVI and XVII (all measures listed in
Article XVI are also subject to Article XVII requirements), as compared to the overlap of
measures that violate those articles (a measure may violate only Article XVI, only Article XVII, or
both)). Cf Mavroidis, Highway X/7 re-visited, supra note 62, at 4, 9 (arguing that Article XVI applies
only to discriminatory measures, and not to a neutral domestic regulation like, for example,
issuance of licenses for new restaurants subject to an economic needs test based on population
density).
Another panel came close, but didn't decide the issue in the end. See Panel Report, United States-

151

Measures Affecting the Cross-BorderSuppy of Gambling and Betting Services 6.426, \VT/DS285/R (Nov.
11, 2004) (finding it unnecessary to determine if the challenged measures violated the United
States' Article XVII commitments once a violation of Article XVI had been established).
154

In 2011, the revenue of UnionPay alone was approximately $1 billion. Zijing Wu, China's UnionPay
Vies With Visa for Global Card Dominance, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/2012-12-11 /china-s-unionpay-vies-with-visa- for-global-card-dominance.html.
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A. Distinguish the Substantive Scope of Provisions from
Rules for Interpreting Schedules
It is impossible to have a scheduling rule that does not also require a
particular view of the scope of Articles XVI and XVII. The work of the CSC on
this issue illustrates the consequences of failing to distinguish the two concepts
and also acknowledge their relationship to one another. In its report, the CSC
appeared to subscribe to the majority view about the relationship between
Articles XVI and XVII, illustrated in Figure 1.155 According to this figure,
nondiscriminatory versions of the measures enumerated in Article XVI:2(a)-(d)
could violate a market access commitment but not a national treatment
commitment; discriminatory measures not enumerated anywhere in Article
XVI:2 could violate only a national treatment commitment; and discriminatory
versions of the measures enumerated in Article XVI:2(a)-(d) along with
inherently discriminatory measures in Article XVI:2(e) and (f) could violate a
market access commitment and a national treatment commitment.
FIGURE

1. Majority View of the Scope of Articles XVI and XVII

Article XVI:
Market Accessq

Article XVI:2(a)-(d) in
nondiscriminatory
form
form

6

Article XVII:
National Treatment

Aricle XVI2(a)(d) in
discriminatory form;

inherently discriminatory
Article XVI:2(e) and (f)

Other discriminatory
measures

The CSC framed the problem of remaining confusion in the case of
different commitment levels as one of schedule interpretation, and did not admit
See CSC, Consideration of Issues Relating to Article XX:2, supra note 149,
4-5. See also Markus
Krajewski & Maika Engelke, Article XVII GATS: National Treatment, in WTO-TRADF. IN
SERVICES, supra note 36, at 396, 416-19 (discussing the standard view, as well as minority views,
including that of Petros Mavroidis, who has argued that Article XVI applies to the listed
restrictions ony when in discriminatory form); MUNIN, supra note 44, at 211 (discussing the
overlap of Articles XVI and XVII).
1S6 Adaptedfrom Pauwelyn, supra note 152, at 161, and CSC, Consideration of Issues Relating to Article
XX:2, supra note 149,
4-5. On the classification of XVI:2(e) as inherently discriminatory, see
supra notes 58 and 130.
155
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of any ambiguity in the scope of the disciplines.157 According to the CSC, a
schedule interpretation rule-which would determine the legal effect of differing
levels of commitment in market access and national treatment in a Member's
schedule-could not alter the purportedly undisputed overlapping relationship
of the substantive disciplines themselves. Yet when the CSC then introduced
various approaches for dealing with schedule interpretation, a number of them
were framed in terms of the substantive scope of the market access and national
treatment disciplines themselves. 58 A recent paper discussing these issues in the
context of China-Electronic Payment Services repeated the CSC's mistakes,
apparently taking at face value the CSC's presentation of different approaches as
if each were a distinct rule for interpreting any schedule against a backdrop of
disciplines with determinate, unchanging scope." 9
Another illustration of logical incoherence about the relationship of the
scope of the disciplines and the obligations that result from a given schedule
entry can be found in China-ElectronicPayment Services itself. China argued that
Article XX:2 delineates the scope of the market access and national treatment
disciplines, as depicted in Figure 2, making Articles XVI and XVII mutually
exclusive in their spheres of application. 6 ° The United States disagreed with
China's allocation of measures and also with the notion that each measure was
subject to only one discipline.' 61 In practice, however, the United States treated
Articles XVI and XVII as mutually exclusive by separating their spheres of
62
application and placing each measure within the scope of only one discipline.
In other words, the only difference between Figures 2 and 3 is the particular
allocation; the two disciplines are effectively mutually exclusive in both figures.

158

See CSC, Consideration of Issues Relating to Article XX:2, supra note 149,
2-4.
For example, approach I is introduced as a rule for reading entries in a schedule-"The area of

159

the overlap would be allocated to the Market Access Column"-but the description that follows
is framed in terms of the reach of the disciplines themselves-"One [solution] could be to state
clearly that all measures referred to under paragraph 2(a)-(0 of Article XVI would fall exclusively
under the scope of that Article, and that they would be excluded-even in their discriminatory
form-from the scope of Article XVII." Id. 16. At least one observer has noted that
implementation of several CSC options would require amending the GATS text. Delimatsis, Don't
Gamble with GATS, supra note 130, at 1074.
Wei Wang, On the Relationship between Market Access and National Treatment under the GATS, 46 INT'L

157

LAW. 1045, 1060-62 (2012). However, Wang's paper does offer some useful insights; for example,
he helpfully frames the question about the overlap of market access and national treatment as a
matter of pre- and post-entry: "[A]re GATS national treatment obligations binding on post-entry
measures only"-so that national treatment commitments only apply after market access
commitments have been extended-"or both post-entry and pre-entry measures?" Id. at 1056.
160 China-Electronic Payment Services Panel Report, supra note 9, 7.646.
161 Id.
162

Id.

7.647, 7.655.
7.647.
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The Panel agreed with the majority view about the scope of Articles XVI
and XVII, flatly rejecting the idea that the two disciplines are mutually
exclusive. 63 But the scheduling rule it settled upon gives the exact same result as
China's mutual exclusivity rule in Figure 2.164 Of course, conceding that in
practice, under any schedule interpretation rule, market access and national
treatment become mutually exclusive, does not answer all possible questions,
since obligations will unavoidably depend on the allocation of measures to each
discipline and whether those allocations are themselves specific to each schedule.
Ultimately, substantive rules are inextricably bound up with scheduling rules.
FIGURE

2. China's View of the Scope of Articles XVI and XV11 65
1
Article XVI:
Market Access

Article XVI:2(a)-(d) in
nondiscriminatory form

Article XVII:
National Treatment

Other discriminatory
measures

Article XVI:2(a)-(d) in
discriminatory form;
inherently discriminatory
Article XVI:2(e) and (f)

163

Id.

164

China-ElectronicPayment Services Panel Report, supra note 9,

165

7.654, 7.658.

7.664 ("We ... do not find that
either of Articles XVI or XVII is substantively subordinate to the other. We find simply that
Article XX:2 establishes a certain scheduling primacy for entries in the market access column.").
Based on id. 7.646.
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FIGURE 3. The United States' Implicit View of the Scope of Articles XVI
and XVII' 66
Article XVI:
Market Access

Article XVII:
National Treatment

Article XVI:2(a)-(d) in
nondiscriminatory form

Article XVI:2(a)-(d) in
discriminatory form;
inherently discriminatory
Article XVI:2(e) and (f)
Other discriminatory
measures

B. Evaluate Rules for Consistency with the GATS Text and
with Members' Expectations
Putting aside any confusion about schedules and scope and substance,
what options are on the table? This Section evaluates four rules based on those
sketched out in the CSC report, extending them to eight different hypothetical
schedules (Scenarios A through H), which are more fully described in Appendix
B below.'67 This exercise provides a fuller picture of each rule, compared to the
CSC's report, which considered the outcome only for Scenario A ("Unbound"
in the market access column, "None" in the national treatment column) and
Scenario F ("None" and "Unbound," respectively). It also draws out the
implications of the rule adopted by the Panel in China-ElectronicPqyment Services.
Although the Panel suggested that the rule it adopted for the commitments
scheduled by China for subsector 7.B(d)-equivalent to Scenario A-follows
unavoidably from the provisions of GATS,168 the Panel doesn't appear to have
considered the effect of its rule in other scheduling scenarios.
The following discussion assumes there is agreement on the scope of
Articles XVI and XVII, along the lines of the majority view illustrated in Figure
166

Based on id. 7.647.

167

The eight scenarios do not exhaust every permutation, but do cover a broad range of possibilities.
Wang's paper on China-ElectronicPayment Services unfortunately does not analyze the rules beyond
the very limited scenarios already found in the CSC's work. Wang, supra note 159, at 1058-59.

168

See generally China-ElectronicPaymentServices Panel Report, supra note 9,

7.645-70.
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1 above. And, while a more complete description of the scenarios can be found
in Appendix B, note that for Scenarios A through E, a greater commitment has
been inscribed in the market access column than in the national treatment
column; for Scenarios F through H, the greater commitment is inscribed in the
national treatment column.

1. Rule 1: Entry in market access column prevails.
Under this interpretive rule, commitments for all the measures enumerated
in Article XVI, whether discriminatory or not, would be governed exclusively by
the entry in the market access column."6 9 At least for Scenario A-the only one
that was in dispute before the Panel-this matches the rule of China-Electronic
Payment Services.170 Applying Rule 1 all the way through the eight scenarios, it's
clear that it is not inherently withholding of commitments nor inherently
liberalizing. For Scenarios A through E, in which the greater commitment is
inscribed in the market access column, the effect is to minimize the scope of
commitments; for Scenarios F through H, with a greater commitment in the
national treatment column, the effect of the rule is more liberalizing.
There is clearly a sense in which the inscription of "None" in the national
treatment column is deprived of effect. It just seems more intuitive to interpret
Scenario A (Unbound/None) 171 as indicating something like this:
We don'tpromiseto letyou in. But ifwe do letyou in, we won't discriminateagainstyou,
compared to domestic services and suppliers. Thus, if we impose a limit on the number of
suppliersfor a given service, say, limiting it to five, aforeign supplier could be among those
five.

But Rule 1 does not treat the national treatment "None" as a qualification on the
market access "Unbound." This also leads to an awkward result for Scenario D
(XVI:2(a)/None): 72 does it really make sense that reserving the right to impose
XVI:2(a) (the right to limit the number of suppliers or quantity of services
supplied) also reserves the right to discriminate and allow only domestic
suppliers to be among the limited group-even though the scheduling Member
committed to no limitations on national treatment?
Rule 1 does give effect to Article XX:2, which even in the Panel's own
words is a rule for "scheduling' rather than "substan[ce]," 17 3 but at the expense of

169

With some exceptions, this matches up with the CSC's rule 1. See CSC, Consideration of Issues

170

Relating to Article .X:2, supra note 149, 16.
See, for example, China-ElectronicPayment Services Panel Report, supra note 9,

171

That is, "Unbound" in the market access column and "None" in the national treatment column.

172

That is, "None except for XVI:2(a)" in the market access column and "None" in the national
treatment column.

173

China-ElectronicPayment Services Panel Report, supra note 9,

Winter 2014

7.664.

7.661.

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

Article XVII, which is a crucial discipline that is fundamental to GATS. By its
own terms, Article XVII clearly operates "in respect of all measures affecting the
supply of services."' 74 So inscribing a measure as a limitation on market access
should not remove that measure from the scope of "all measures affecting the
supply of services," such that an inscribed national treatment commitment
concerning that measure is meaningless. As a proponent of this result has
conceded, the rule can be explained only by giving more weight to Article XX:2
than to Article XVII, 175 an approach that contradicts the clearly subordinate
status of the scheduling rule in Article XX:2 relative to the fundamental
commitment of national treatment laid out in Article XVII, and which belies the
Article XX:2 as a rule of scheduling
Panel's assertion that it properly treated
76
convenience rather than substance.
2. Rule 2: Entry in national treatment column prevails.
Under this interpretive rule, all discriminatory measures (including
quantitative measures in XVI:2(a)-(d) when in discriminatory form, as well as
the inherently discriminatory measures in XVI:2(e)-()) would be governed by
the national treatment entry. Only nondiscriminatory market access measures
(XVI:2(a)-(d) in nondiscriminatory form) would be governed by the market
access entry. 77 At least for Scenario A, this rule achieves the outcome favored by
the United States in China-ElectronicPayment Services.178 Like Rule 1, Rule 2 is not
inherently withholding of commitments nor inherently liberalizing. But unlike
Rule 1, Rule 2 does not give greater weight to Article XX:2 than to the phrase
"all measures" in Article XVII, and in this respect is more consistent with the
treaty text. Rule 2 treats the national treatment entry as a qualification on the
market access entry, in that it makes the national treatment entry a qualification
on the use of discriminatory forms of the measures in Article XVI:2(a)-(d) and
the use of the inherently discriminatory measures in Article XVI:2(e)-(f).
Rule 2 does have its own problems, though; it renders some language mere
surplusage, and renders other language (in particular, subparagraphs XVI:2(e)
and XVI:2(f) of the treaty text) ineffective. As a result, any scheduling language
based on the coverage of those measures by Article XVI would be either
174 GATS art. XVII:1, supra note 7.
175

MARKUS KRAJEWSKI, NATIONAL REGULATION AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN SERVICES: THE
LEGAL IMPACT OF THE GATS ON NATIONAL REGULATORY AUTONOMY 115 (2003) (finding "a

176

strong argument for a lex specialis relationship between Article[s] XVI and XVII for discriminatory
restrictions on market access").
See China-ElectronicPayment Services Panel Report, supranote 9, 7.664.

177

With some exceptions, this matches up with the CSC's rule 2. See CSC, Consideration of Issues

178

Relating to Article XX:2, supra note 149, 17.
See China-Ekectronic PaymentServices Panel Report, supra note 9,

7.647.
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ineffective or at least surplusage. For example, in Scenario E (XVI:2(f)/None),
the scheduling country's effort to retain the right to impose XVI:2() measures
would fail; the phrase "except for (f)" would be rendered ineffective. In
Scenarios C (all but XVI:2(t)/None) and H (XVI:2(f)/Unbound), the phrase
"except for (f)" would be surplusage, as the result intended by that language
would be achieved even without it.
Finally, Rule 2 leads to an awkward result for Scenarios F through H,
where the deeper commitment is inscribed in the market access column.
Perversely, Rule 2 would mean that domestic quantitative regulations would be
prohibited, but discriminatoy versions of those regulations would be allowed in
these scenarios. This result is perverse because GATS commitments are meant
to tackle head on Members' barriers to trade; any limitations on a Member's
freedom to adopt regulations typically considered domestic in focus are simply a
179
collateral result.
3. Less-liberalizing entry
(Rule 4) prevails.

(Rule

3)

or

more-liberalizing

entry

Rule 3-always letting the less-liberalizing of the market access and
national treatment entries govern-avoids the awkward result in Scenarios F
through H created by Rule 2, but there is no basis in the treaty text for this rule.
The main thing to recommend it is that there will be no unpleasant surprises for
the scheduling Member-but its trading partners might feel that they got less than
they bargained for. Similarly, Rule 4--abiding by the more-liberalizing entryavoids the awkward result of Rule 1 in Scenarios A through D, in which the
scheduling Member is free to discriminate after foreign suppliers are allowed in
door, but also lacks textual support. And conversely, while the scheduling
country might find itself obligated to extend greater concessions than it
intended, its trading partners would not have their expectations dashed.
C. Concede That No Rule Can Satisfy All Goals
This analysis reveals that no one rule can be completely consistent with the
GATS text and with Members' expectations. Rules 1 and 2 have more basis in
the treaty text than Rules 3 and 4, but lead to awkward or even preposterous
results in some situations. The adoption of Rule 3 or 4, on the other hand,
would be more clearly a political choice-a choice to err on the side of less

179

See generally

DELIMATSIS, INTERNATIONAi. TRADE IN SERVICES AND DOMESTIc REGULATIONS,

supra note 39. See also Mavroidis, Highway Xlii re-visited, supra note 62, at 9 (going even farther and
arguing that Article XVI was never intended to bind a Member's regulation of domestic supply,
and applies only to discriminatory measures).
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liberalization (Rule 3) or more liberalization (Rule 4).18 Given that no rule can
claim greater theoretical purity than the others, a reasonable approach would be
to minimize disruptions of the current balance of commitments among
countries. In this approach, the selection of the best rule becomes an empirical
question, which could be framed in two ways.
First, a WTO panel could ask, in each dispute that comes before it, which
rule would result in the smallest total shift in welfare, comparing the chosen
outcome to both the scheduling Member's factually plausible understanding of
its own schedule and the complaining Member's understanding of that schedule.
But of course, the rule from one dispute would not be applicable to other
disputes, and as discussed in Section II.C, the DSB has shown a strong distaste
for multiplicity of meaning. This approach would also lead to more litigation, as
Members would find it harder to gauge the strength of their claims by consulting
past cases.
Second, a WTO committee (with the help of the Members) could comb
through existing schedules to identify instances of potential conflict between
market access and national treatment inscriptions. The committee could then
apply to every Member's schedule each of the four rules sketched out in the
report of the Committee on Specific Commitments in 2003181 and further
developed in this Comment. The objective function 82 to be minimized could
then be any number of things: total number of schedules or entries affected;
total number of adverse outcomes for the Member whose schedule would be
subject to the most adverse interpretations; total number of adverse outcomes
for developing countries; the total amount of supply in the domestic market of
the scheduling Member subject to an adverse outcome; same, but using the
share of the subsector in the Member's gross national product, in percentage
points; and so on. This approach would provide consistency and prevent future
disputes, and is thus the more desirable one, but there may well not be enough
momentum within the WTO for such an undertaking.

180

Wang takes the view that the choice of which rule to follow is "more a choice of conservatism or

181

liberalism than a technical problem." Wang, supra note 159, at 1065.
See CSC, Considerationof Issues Relating to Article XX:2, supra note 149,

182

That is, the target of the optimization problem (which in this case would be a minimization

15-20.

problem).
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V. LOOKING AHEAD: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE GATS
DISPUTES AND THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN
SERVICES AGREEMENT

A. China-ElectronicPayment Services: Problems and
Possible Solutions
The China-Electronic Payment Services Panel Report reveals a number of
challenges for the DSB and parties to GATS disputes. Greater clarity about how
to define the scope of scheduled subsectors would help resolve just the sort of
threshold question to which the China-ElectronicPayment Services Panel had to
devote roughly fifty pages, in its two-hundred page report.'83 As many GATS
sectors take the form of two-sided networks, more direct engagement by the
parties and the DSB with the rapidly advancing economic modeling of platform
competition will likely be central to establishing evidentiary burdens and
identifying the smoking gun in GATS disputes." 4 Finally, it is all but certain that
the issue of inconsistent market access and national treatment commitments will
come up again. The China- Electronic Payment Services Panel Report does not
provide sufficient guidance about how to resolve inconsistencies that take forms
other than that in China's schedule, and may not even properly apply to a
different case with the same Unbound/None scheduling conundrum.' 5
As the analysis in Section IV and Appendix B has shown, there is no rule
of schedule interpretation that is entirely consistent with the GATS text and
which would give a reasonable result, relative to the expectations of the
scheduling Member and its trading partners, in all scheduling scenarios. The
China-Electronic Payment Services Panel erred, not so much in choosing a
reasonable outcome for this case, but in portraying this outcome as the result of
the purportedly nonhierarchical Articles XVI and XVII and of a singular rule of
schedule interpretation consistent with the fixed, certain meaning of Article XX.
Reading the Panel's discussion of these Articles, one cannot help but feel that
the internal inconsistencies within GATS are being swept under the rug, whether
intentionally or not. To conclude that systemic problems are not actually
problems risks undermining the credibility, and thus "security and
predictability,"'8 6 of GATS obligations. A perhaps more politically sustainable
route would be to admit that there is a problem and then take a pragmatic,
empirical, harm- or surprise-minimizing approach to approximating the
183

184

See supra Section III.A.
See sioqra Section II.B.

185 See supra Sections III.C and IV.
186

DSU,supra note 67, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 407.
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common intention of Members, based on ferreting out and resolving existing
problems in Members' schedules, as outlined in Section IV.C. If there is
insufficient momentum for taking on the project of analyzing all existing
schedules, and for agreeing on the metric to be minimized, a less satisfying but
initially easier approach would be to simply limit the precedential impact of the
interpretation of any one ambiguous schedule entry on other disputes. Panels
could base their case-by-case rulings on the plausible prior expectations of the
parties to the particular dispute,187 again with the goal of minimizing surprises
and approximating the common intention of the parties to the dispute.
B. The TISA: Finally Getting It Right?
To the extent that there currently is momentum to negotiate around
services trade liberalization, it is focused not on GATS but on the nascent Trade
in Services Agreement, or TISA.188 Initiated by the so-called "Really Good
Friends of Services" group of countries,189 the negotiations began in late 2012,
and publicly announced in early 2013, are motivated by four factors. First,
technological change, particularly in information technology, has dramatically
expanded the scope for trade in services compared to the landscape when GATS
was negotiated twenty years ago. 9 ' Second, the evolution of several developingcountry economies to invest not only in agriculture and manufacturing but also
services has contributed to making services an even larger share of global output

187

As under the current structure, nonparty Members would still have the right to weigh in on the

dispute before the Panel.
188 Current sources have come to refer to the agreement as the Trade in Services Agreement,
abbreviated as TISA or TiSA. See, for example, Sauv6, supra note 8, at 2 ("Initially called the
'International Services Agreement' (ISA),... [ithas since been renamed the 'Trade in Services
Agreement' (ISA)."); Request for Comments on Additional Participants in Trade in Services
Agreement, 78 Fed. Reg. 55135, supra note 8. Early on, the United States spoke of an
International Services Agreement (ISA), while the EU used the phrase Plurilateral Agreement on
Services. See, for example, De Micco, supra note 8 ("The agreement was called the 'international
services agreement' by the United States and the 'plurilateral services agreement' by the EU.").
The term plurilateralechoes the titles of certain existing WTO agreements to which only some
WTO Members are parties (such as the Plurilateral Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft), and
reflected the EU's strong interest in keeping any new agreement tethered to the WTO. De Micco,
supra note 8. For additional background on the TISA, see generally DAVID A. GANTZ,
LIBERALIZING INTERNATIONAL TRADE ArIER DOHA: MULTILATERAL, PLURILATERAL, REGIONAL,

ch. 7 (2013).
See Press Release, European Commission, Negofiationsfor a Plun/lateralAgreementon Trade in Services,
AND UNII-ATERAI. INITIATIVES

189

MEMO/13/107 (Feb. 15, 2013), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseMEMO-13107_en.htm (describing the Really Good Friends of Services as "an ad-hoc coalition of all those
WTO members that showed willingness to advance [] services negotiations'). Supra note 8 lists
the current roster of participants, as of September 2013.
190 Sauv6, supranote 8, at 5.
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and trade, 1 ' and a new area of focus for developing-country governments
hoping that services will be "a conduit for 'leapfrogging' traditional paths of
economic growth."19' 2 Third, "[f]rustration over the glacial pace of multilateral
market opening and over the inability of services to gain adequate traction in the
[Doha Round of negotiations] ... has prompted a large and growing number of
WTO Members to turn"'93 away from GATS, and instead toward multisectoral
regional and bilateral PTAs 194 and toward the services-focused TISA. Finally, the
TISA negotiations also reflect the discontent of many high-income, serviceintensive economies-particularly the United States-with the shallowness of
GATS commitments19 5 and the perceived inefficacy of the DSB in holding
China accountable for the commitments that these countries thought (or hoped)
they had bargained for.'96 The China-ElectronicPayment Services Panel's rejection
of the United States' effective monopoly claims, and reading of China's
commitment inscriptions in the least liberalizing manner, could push the United
States to turn its back on GATS (and the WTO) as the right instrument (and
forum) for opening markets to U.S. service suppliers.
Liberalizing trade in services presents its own unique challenges, apart from
any disagreement among countries about the appropriate pace and pattern of
opening. First, as noted in Section II.B.1, trade in services, and the associated
trade barriers, are fundamentally different from trade in goods and goodsoriented protectionism. Services are intangible and are delivered through varied
modes of supply1 97 and, unlike tariffs, barriers to trade in services are embedded
in domestic regulation, nontransparent, and difficult to quantify. 98 As a result,
191 Hufbauer, Jensen & Stephenson, supra note 8, at 3 (noting that one- to two-thirds of the labor
force is now employed in services in low- and middle-income countries, respectively, as compared
to three-fourths in high-income countries, and that the share of developing countries in services
exports has roughly doubled in the past twenty-five years, to about one fifth of the global total).
192
Id. at 4 (explaining that services are now understood as an "enabler," promoting growth
throughout the economy by greasing than chains that link production in agriculture,
manufacturing, and final service industries).
193
Sauv6, supra note 8, at 6.
194

See supra notes 4-6.

195

197

See, for exarnpk, Sauv6, supra note 8, at 5 ("The Uruguay Round's negotiating harvest in services
was a mere (and meek) down payment, richer on rules (even if incomplete) than on market
opening commitments.").
On the perception among U.S. policymakers that the DSB has failed to hold China accountable
under the Antidumping Agreement and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, see generally Cartand, Depayre & Woznoski and Greenwald, supra note 71.
For an explanation of modes of supply, see supra text accompanying notes 35-36.

198

See MUNIN, supra note 44, at 11; Hoekman, Assessing the General Agreement, supra note 37, at 90

196

(citing regulated telecommunications monopolies and oligopolistic markets for financial services,
as well as self-regulating professional services, as examples of highly regulated services).
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the tools for combating protectionism in trade in goods can be ineffective
against the protectionist measures inhibiting trade in services. Second, while
easily quantifiable indicators like the value of bilateral trade flows can be used to
set objectives, evaluate the position of others, and assess negotiating progress in
goods-trade negotiations, the complexity of identifying and quantifying barriers
to trade in services has tended to shift the focus of service-trade negotiations
away from the identification, quantification, and reduction of barriers, to
"absolute sectoral reciprocity" instead.'99 In the GATS negotiations, that focus
promoted a narrative of tit-for-tat rather than general recognition of gains for all
from liberalization.2 0
Will the TISA negotiations be any more successful than the original GATS
negotiations? There is already one significant reason to worry about the TISA
negotiations-the lack of transparency. So far, the negotiating countries have
' 20 2
made public very little information2 ' and have operated as a "closed club
made up of primarily high-income countries.2 3 This approach echoes the "us
against them/build it and they'll beg to join" attitude that has characterized other
negotiations that subsequently failed to get developing-country buy-in: the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services, which no developing
20 4
countries adopted, and the abandoned Multilateral Agreement on Investment.
The GATS negotiations, by contrast, were much more transparent and inclusive
of all WTO Members, but the depth of the resulting commitments was
disappointing.
Given the lack of transparency, it is difficult to know how the substance of
the TISA will be different from GATS, and whether it will improve upon
GATS, but some clues are available. The United States apparently favored a
negative list approach for scheduling of services, 2 5 which would be a more
199

Hoekman, Assessing the GeneralAgreement,supranote 37, at 92.

200

Id.

201 As one author has noted, "[a] proxy of the (inadequate) level of transparency of the proposed
plurilateral negotiations can be derived from the paucity of information on TISA yielded from a
simple 'Googling' of the proposed agreement's acronym." Sauv6, supra note 8, at 5 n.6.
202

Id. at 7.

203

See supra note 8 for a lists of participants.

204

Sauv6, supra note 8, at 7. For a discussion of the Understanding on Commitments in Financial
Services, see supra note 93. The Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) grew out of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in the mid-1990s and
floundered when it became at focal point for anti-globalization protests. On the MAI, see, for
example, Amrita Ray Chaudhuri & Hassan Benchekroun, The Costs and Benefits of fAs to Developing
Countries:An Economic Perspective, in IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 93,

205

97 (Armand de Mestral & C6line LUvesque eds., 2013).
Compromise 'Wybrid"Approacbfor Serices Deal Largey Follows GATS, 30 INSIDE U.S. TRADE, no. 40,
Oct. 12, 2012, available at Westdaw, 2012 WLNR 21681197; De Micco, supra note 8, at 13.
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aggressive tool for liberalization, °6 and would avoid some of the problems
discussed in Section III.A above. While a positive list would mean that
participants would be liberalizing only in those sectors specifically listed, under a
more ambitious negative list approach, all service sectors would be liberalized
except for those specifically exempted by each country. 2 v The European Union
rejected the U.S. proposal and the parties reached a compromise for scheduling
of market access commitments in services. A country would schedule a positive
list of the sectors in which it would grant market access, but, employing a
negative list approach within each broad listed sector, the country could
specifically exempt subsectors from that general rule-just as in GATS.2 8
However, in a significant departure from GATS, the TISA will likely employ a
negative list approach for national treatment. The United States successfully
argued for an ambitious national treatment commitment that would in principle
be applied on a horizontal 2 9 basis to all service sectors and modes of supply,
with any exemptions listed21° in each country's schedule of commitments.
The currently contemplated hybrid structure might make the task of
defining services even more complicated than it has proven under GATS,
because it will require an approach to schedule interpretation that fits with both
negative and positive scheduling. But the structure does appear to avoid the
problem at the heart of the China-ElectronicPayment Services dispute: as long as a
schedule extends a market access commitment, there is no question about the
211
national treatment commitment.
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De Micco, supra note 8, at 12.

207

Id.

208

Compromise 'Tlybrid"Approachfor Services Deal Lagey Follows GATS, supra note 205.

209

For an explanation of horizontal commitments, see supra note 55.

210

The list of exemptions would be the "negative list" of services-setting out those services for
which a country is not committing to extend national treatment.
There remains, of course, the problem of how GATS and TISA commitments can relate to each
other. As a matter of politics, the lack of transparency in the negotiation process will be a barrier
to widespread adoption and perceived legitimacy. Sauv6, supra note 8, at 7. As to the law, it is
unclear how to reconcile commitments made under radically different architectures, id.at 11,
especially where GATS commitments alone are already ambiguous.
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APPENDIX

A: EXCERPT OF CHINA'S SCHEDULE

Sector or sub-sector

Limitations on market access

7. FINANCIAL SERVICES
A. All Insurance...
B. Banking and Other
Financial Services
(excluding insurance and
securities)
Banking services as listed
below:"
a....
d Allpayment and money
transmission services,
including credit, charge
and debit cards,
travellers cheques and
bankers draft(including
import and export
settlement'
iv

(1) [Cross-border supply]
Unboundv except for the
following:
- Provision and transferoffinancial
information, andfinandaldata
processing and relatedsoftware by
suppliers of otherfinandalservices;
-Advisory, intermediation and other
auxiliagyfinancialserviceson all
activities listed in subparagraphs(a)
through (k), including credit reference
andanalysis, investment andportfolio
research and advice, admce on
acquisitionsand on corporate
restructuingand strategy."'
...
i
(3) [Commercial presence]'
A. Geographic coverage ....
B. Clients....
C. Lcensing ....
[Additional conditions-for
example, total assets, years of
operation-on certain financial
institutions establishing
subsidiaries in China] ...
otherwise, none.
(1) [Cross-border supply] None
...
(3) [Commercial presence]
None
(Criteria for authorization to deal
in China's financial services sector
are solely prudential (in other
words, contain no economic
needs test or quantitative limits
on licenses). Branches of foreign
institutions are permitted.

Other financial services as
listed below:x
k. Provision and transfer of
financial information, and
financial data processing
and related software by
supplier of other financial
services;
1. Advisory, intermediation
and other auxiliary
financial services on all
activities listed in
subparagraphs (a) through
(k), including credit
reference and analysis,
investment and portfolio
research and advice,
advice on acquisitions and
on corporate restructuring
and strategy.

i

Limitation on national
treatment
(1) [Cross-border supply]
None'' i
...
(3) [Commercial presence]
Except for geographic
restrictions and client
limitations on local
currency business (listed in
the market access column),
foreign financial institution
may do business, without
restrictions or need for caseby-case approval, with foreign
invested enterprises, nonChinese natural persons,
Chinese natural persons and
Chinese enterprises.
Otherwise, none. ix

(1) [Cross-border supply]
None
...
(3) [Commercial presence]
None

VoL 14 No. 2

Market Access & NaionalTreatment

Block

Panel Report, China-Certain Measures Affecting Electronic Payment Services, Annex G at G-2,
WT/DS413/R fJuly 16, 2012) [hereinafter China-Electronic Payment Services Panel Report]
(providing an excerpt of China's schedule) (bold and italics emphases added). A fourth column
for inscribing Article XVIII additional commitments has been omitted. For China's complete
schedule, see Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, Addendum, Schedule CII
The People's Republic of China, Part Il-Schedule of Specific Commitments on Services,
WT/ACC/CHN/49/Add.2 (Oct. 1, 2001).
The headings "Banking services as listed below" and "Other financial services as listed below" are
unique to China's schedule: they do not appear in the Annex on Financial Services (see supra note
93) or in other \VTO Members' schedules. China-ElectronicPayment Services Panel Report, supra
note i, 7.124.

iv

Agreeing with the United States, the Panel found that this subsector-7.B(d)-included electronic
payment services (EPS). Id. 7.204. The wording exactly matches subsector 5(a)(viii) in the
Annex on Financial Services, except for one difference: China has added the parenthetical phrase
"(including import and export settlement)." (The drafters have also deleted the "s" at the end of
"drafts," probably inadvertently.) Id. T 7.106.
The list of scheduled subsectors continues through (0,and then jumps to (k). This means China

V

has not made any specific or conditional commitments in subsectors (g)-(i).
"Unbound" for (d) means that China reserves the right to restrict market access-except for the

vi

two identified areas (in italics), where China does make a market access commitment. The Panel
found that those two areas simply refer to the full market access commitment ("None") in
subsectors (k) and (1); see infra note vi.
The United States argued that EPS fall within these two categories of services, and that these

ViI

categories of services fit within subsector 7.B(d). This reading would mean that China had
committed to impose no limitations on market access for mode I trade in EPS. The Panel rejected
this reading, finding the mention of these two items to be a redundant reference to the full market
access commitment for mode I trade in subsectors 7.B(k) and 7.B(1). China-ElectronicPayment
Services Panel Report, supranote i, 9 7.524.
The listed sets of limitations for (d) mean that China does make a market access commitment, but

that commitment is subject to the qualifications listed in A-C. China committed that within five
years of accession, in other words, by 2006, it would phase out all geographic restrictions and any
non-prudential restrictions on ownership or juridical form of foreign financial institutions (FFIs)
(including suppliers of EPS). However, China still requires FFIs to have three years (two of them
profitable) of commercial-presence experience in licensed foreign currency business before
moving into domestic currency business. [d.% 7.572-73, 7.575.
Viii "None" for (d) means that China has made an absolute commitment to unfettered national

ix

treatment of foreign services-which, nevertheless, the Panel found to be limited by the
"Unbound" market access inscription.
The listed sets of limitations for (d) mean that China does make a national treatment commitment

x

that is limited by the relevant qualifications listed in the mode 3 entry in the market access
column.
See supra note ii.
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APPENDIX

B: SCHEDULE INTERPRETATION RULES
IN PRACTICE xi

Scenario A

Limitations on:

Scenario B

Scenario C

Scenario D

Unbound except

Unbound except

None except for

for XVI:2() (no
cap on share of
foreign capital)

XVI:2(a) (reserve
right to use quota on
number of suppliers)

Market Access

Unbound

for XVI:2(a) (no
quota on number
of suppliers)

National Treatment

None

None

None

None

Rule 1. Market

May

IXVI:2(a)-(d) in

XVI:2(b)-(d) in

XVI:2(a)-(d) in

XVI:2(a) in any

access column
entry governs

use

any form;
XV1:2(e)-(0

any form;
XVl:2(e)-(0

any form;
XVI:2(e)

form

May

Discriminatory

Discriminatory

Discriminatory

Discriminatory

not
use

measures not
enumerated by

measures not
enumerated by

measures not
enumerated by

measures not
enumerated by

Article XVI:2

Article XV1:2;

Article XVI:2;

Article XVI:2;

XVI:2(a)

XVI:2(F)

XVI:2(b)-(d);
XV1:2(e)-(f)

overlap

Rule 2. National

May

Non-

Non-

Non-

Non-discriminatory

treatment

use

discriminatory

discriminatory

discriminatory

forms of XVI:2(a)

forms of
XVl:2(a)-(d)

forms of
XV1:2(b)-(d)

forms of
XVI:2(a)-(d)

May
not

Discriminatory
measures not

Discriminatory
measures not

Discriminatory
measures not

Discriminatory
measures not

use

enumerated in
XVI:2;
discriminatory
versions of

enumerated in
XVI:2;
discriminatory
versions of

enumerated in
XVI:2;
discriminatory
versions of

enumerated in
XVI:2;
discriminatory
versions of

XVI:2(a)-(d);

XVI:2(b)-(d);

XVI:2(a)-(d);

XVI:2(a); any

XVJ:2(e)-(f)

XVI:2(e)-(t;
XVI:2(a) in any

XVl:2(e)-(f)

version of
XVI:2(b)-(d);

column entry
governs overlap

XVI:2(e)-(f)

form
Rule 3. Less-liberalizing
entry governs overlap

Same as Rule 1

Rule 4. More-liberalizing
entry governs overlap

Same as Rule 2

xi

See supra Section IV.B for a full discussion of the Rules and Scenarios.
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Limitations on:

Scenario E

Block

Scenario F

None except for
XVI:2(f) (reserve
right to use cap

Scenario G

Scenario H

None except for
XVI:2(a) (reserve

None except for
XVI:2(o (reserve
right to use cap on

Market Access

on share of
foreign capital)

None

right to use quota on
number of suppiers)

share of foreign
capital)

National Treatment

None

Unbound

Unbound

Unbound

XVI:2(f)

Discriminatory

Discriminatory

Discriminatory

measures not
enumerated by

measures not
enumerated by

measures not
enumerated by

Article XVI:2

Article XVI:2;
XVI:2(a) in any

Article XVI:2;
XVI:2(f)

Rule 1. Market

May

access column
entry governs

use

overlap

form
May

Discriminatory

XVI:(a)-(d);

XVI:2(b)-(d);

XVl:(a)-(d);

not

measures not

XVI:2(e)-(f)

XVI:2(e)-(f)

XVI:2(e)

use

enumerated by
Article XVI:2;
XVI:2(a)-(d);
Discriminatory
measures not

Discriminatory
measures not

Discriminatory
measures not

enumerated by
Article XVI:2;
XVI:2(a)-(d)

enumerated by

enumerated by

Article XVI:2;
XVI:2(a) in any

Article XVI:2;
XVI:2(a)-(d) but

but only if
discriminatory;
XVI:2(e)-(t)

form; XVI:2(b)-(d)
but only if
discriminatory;

only if
discriminatory;
XVI:2(e)-(f)

XVI:2(e)
Rule 2. National
treatment

May
use

column entry
governs overlap

XVI:2(e)-(o
May

Discriminatory

Non-

Non-discriminatory

Non-discriminatory

not
use

measures not
enumerated by
Article XVI:2;

discriminatory
forms of
XVI:2(a)-(d)

forms of XVI:2(b)(d)

forms of XVI:2(a)(d)

XVI:2(a)-(d);
XVI:2(e)-(f).

Rule 3. Less-liberalizing
entry governs overlap
Rule 4. Moreliberalizing entry
governs overlap
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Same as Rule 1

Same as Rule 2

Same as Rule 2

Same as Rule 1

